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Auction Theory and Standstills: 
Dealing with Friends and Foes in 
a Sale of Corporate Control  
Christina M. Sautter† 
Abstract  
A fundamental issue in Delaware mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
law is the extent to which a target company’s board of directors may 
restrict a sales process to extract value from bidders and grant a 
“winning bidder” certain deal protections that protect a transaction 
from topping bids. Standstill agreements are one such form of deal 
protection. Standstills prevent bidders from making or announcing a 
bid for the target without the target’s consent, both during the sales 
process and for a period after the sales process is completed and the 
target has executed an agreement with a winning bidder. Recent 
Delaware Court of Chancery rulings have placed a new spotlight on 
the use of standstill agreements in M&A deals and specifically in 
change-of-control transactions. In particular, these cases highlight the 
restrictiveness of some standstills and open up discussion as to how 
restrictive a standstill may be without violating a target company 
board of directors’ duty to maximize stockholder value.  
This Article makes a unique contribution. It is the first article to 
apply auction theory in critiquing and evaluating the need for 
standstills in M&A transactions. Auction theory is an applied branch 
of economics used to design optimal bidding procedures and revenue-
enhancing auctions. The application of auction theory to standstills is 
particularly well suited as the execution of a standstill is often cited 
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as resulting in increased value during the sales process. Using auction 
theory and recent Delaware case law as a foundation, this Article 
provides a new framework for the use of standstills. It argues that to 
the extent standstills provide an entry into the due diligence and 
general sales processes, standstills may help to enhance value. 
Moreover, the promise of standstill restrictions continuing postsigning 
may aid in incentivizing bidders to submit their highest offers during 
the presigning sale process. But the use of more restrictive 
standstills—such as those in which a bidder agrees not to request a 
waiver and a target agrees in advance not to waive a standstill, 
known as Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive (DADW) standstills—should turn 
on the amount of presigning shopping in which the target board has 
engaged. This Article provides a new framework for deal makers and 
courts, suggesting that if deal makers are to continue their use of 
DADW standstills, they should be paired with a minimal fiduciary 
out and a staggered termination fee.  
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Introduction 
A fundamental tension in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) law 
exists between a selling company’s board of directors’ Revlon1 duty to 
maximize stockholder value in a sale of control and the board’s ability 
to restrict the sales process and grant a “winning bidder” certain 
covenants that protect the transaction from being overbid.2 Standstill 
agreements are one such way the board of a selling company, the 
target, restricts the sales process and discourages overbids.3 In 
particular, standstills prevent bidders who are participating in the 
sales process from making or announcing a bid for the target without 
the target’s consent, both during the sales process and for a period 
after the process is completed and the target has executed an 
agreement with a winning bidder.4  
Standstills help the target to control the sales process and ensure 
bidders do not preempt the process by making offers directly to the 
target’s stockholders or by otherwise bidding before the target is 
ready to receive offers.5 Moreover, presigning standstills may help a 
board satisfy its Revlon duty to maximize stockholder value, as 
standstills may provide the target board “leverage to extract 
 
1. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 
182 (Del. 1986). 
2. See id. at 182 (describing a board of directors as “auctioneers charged 
with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the 
company”); see also Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 
914, 938 (Del. 2003) (describing the limitations on a board’s authority to 
grant deal protections to a winning bidder). The term “overbid” is used in 
this Article to refer to “topping bids” or “jumping bids,” situations in 
which another prior bid or agreement is topped by a higher bid.  
3. The target and its financial advisor generally require that auction 
participants execute a confidentiality agreement before gaining access to 
the target’s nonpublic information. Alexander S. Gorbenko & Andrey 
Malenko, Strategic and Financial Bidders in Takeover Auctions, 
J. Fin. (forthcoming) (Apr. 2014 manuscript at 9), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1559481. The standstill 
can be a separate standalone document or, more typically, it appears as 
a provision in the confidentiality agreement. See Martin Marietta 
Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 68 A.3d 1208, 1218 n.43 (Del. 
2012). The terms “standstill,” “standstill agreement,” and “standstill 
provision” will be used interchangeably in this Article. 
4. See Martin Marietta, 68 A.3d at 1219 (“Typically a standstill agreement 
will prohibit a hostile bid in any form . . . .”). 
5. William G. Lawlor, Taming the Tiger: Difficult Standstill Agreement 
Issues for Targets, Deal Law., July–Aug. 2007, at 7 (noting that 
standstills “provide[ ] a stable environment in which the sales process 
can be managed and controlled by the target”). 
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concessions from the parties who seek to make a bid.”6 Because most 
standstills do not expire upon the target’s execution of a definitive 
agreement with a winning bidder, most standstills are intended to 
prevent later overbidding during the preclosing period, the time 
between the signing and closing of the contemplated transaction.7 In 
this way, targets and winning bidders use standstills as a type of deal-
protection device preclosing. For these reasons, standstills have been 
called “the M&A equivalent of a schoolyard ‘time-out.’”8 In other 
words, standstills keep friendly bidders friendly and prevent them 
from becoming foes either to the target or to the winning bidder.9 
Despite the intended benefits of standstills, like any deal-protection 
device, standstills are not without drawbacks. Because a target 
board’s Revlon duties do not end at the execution of a definitive 
agreement but instead continue until the stockholders vote on the 
proposed transaction, standstills potentially hinder the board from 
complying with its Revlon duties.10 More specifically, standstills 
 
6. In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 91 (Del. Ch. 2007). In a 
2011 case dealing with a standstill waiver, then-Chancellor Strine 
reiterated this view: 
I mean, it is pretty well understood that part of what you can 
do as a first-in bidder who is actually binding yourself to buy a 
company is get some deal protections that insure that, you 
know, you won’t be topped lightly; that there aren’t free riders; 
and then make the target board make certain determinations 
before they get out of a merger agreement. 
Status Conference and Motion to Expedite at 22, In re Transatlantic 
Holdings, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. Nos. 6574-CS & 6776-CS, (Del. Ch. 
Aug. 22, 2011).  
7. See Robert E. Spatt & Peter Martelli, The Four Ring Circus-
Round Sixteen; A Further Updated View of the Mating Dance 
Among Announced Merger Partners and an Unsolicited 
Second or Third Bidder 40 (2012); Christina M. Sautter, Promises 
Made to be Broken? Standstill Agreements in Change of Control 
Transactions, 37 Del. J. Corp. L. 929, 932 (2013).  
8. Proxy Battle Time-Out: Standstills Give Boards a Breather, Thomson 
Reuters (Apr. 2, 2009), http://currents.westlawbusiness.com/Articles/
2009/07/20090731_0005.aspx?cid=&src=; see also Lawlor, supra note 5, 
at 7 (describing standstills as “corporate peace treaties”). 
9. In this Article, the term “friendly” refers to negotiated acquisitions in 
which the target company board approves the sale terms and is 
receptive to a bidder’s overtures. Conversely, the term “foes” refers to 
hostile transactions in which a bidder does not agree with the target 
board’s decision regarding the sales process.  
10. See Steven M. Davidoff, Gods at War: Shotgun Takeovers, 
Government by Deal, and the Private Equity Implosion 236 
(2009) (explaining that under Revlon a target “must keep itself up for 
sale . . . up to a shareholder vote on the transaction”); Omnicare, Inc. v. 
NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 938 (Del. 2003) (“The directors of a 
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prevent bidders from making overbids and may prevent boards from 
considering overbids, even if an overbid provides more value than the 
deal with the winning bidder.11 Moreover, there is always a risk that a 
target board may use a standstill to improperly favor one bidder over 
another or to otherwise entrench itself in office.12  
Recently, the Delaware courts have issued several decisions 
commenting on the restrictiveness of some standstills and their 
potential interference with the satisfaction of a board’s Revlon 
duties.13 As a result, there has been a surge in the attention being 
paid to standstills by practitioners.14 But, to date, scholars have yet 
to address the dichotomy that standstills raise between aiding and 
hindering value maximization. In a recently published article, I 
touched upon this dichotomy by using past Delaware case law to 
 
Delaware corporation have a continuing obligation to discharge their 
fiduciary responsibilities, as future circumstances develop, after a merger 
agreement is announced.”).  
11. See In re Celera Corp. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 6304–VCP, 2012 WL 
1020471, at *6 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012) (describing how under a DADW 
standstill, a target company “could not reach out to [already-interested 
buyer companies], and those [buyer] companies could not reach out to 
[the target] to take the necessary first step—requesting a waiver of the 
standstill restrictions—to make a competing offer”); Paul Povel & 
Rajdeep Singh, Takeover Contests with Asymmetric Bidders, 19 Rev. 
Fin. Stud. 1399, 1402 (2006) (“[Deal-protection] devices make the 
target less attractive to rejected bidders, thereby reducing their 
incentive to top up the winning bid.”).  
12. In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 91 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
13. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 
68 A.3d 1208 (Del. 2012); Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings Inc., C.A. 
No. 8373-VCG, 2013 WL 2181518 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013); In re 
Ancestry.com Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7988–CS (Del. Ch. 
Dec. 17, 2012); Celera Corp., 2012 WL 1020471; In re Rehabcare Grp., 
Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6197–VCL, 2011 Del Ch. LEXIS 208 (Del. 
Ch. Sept. 8, 2011); Topps Co., 926 A.2d 58. 
14. See, e.g., Steven M. Haas, “Don’t Ask/Don’t Waive” Standstill 
Agreements Under Attack, Insights, Dec. 2012, at 29; Peter J. 
Walsh Jr. et. al., Delaware Insider: “Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive” Standstill 
Provisions: Impermissible Limitation on Director Fiduciary Obligations 
or Legitimate, Value-Maximizing Tool?, Bus. L. Today, Jan. 2013, 
at 1; An Ounce of Prevention—Some Guidance for Target Boards, 
Kirkland M&A Update (Kirkland & Ellis LLP), Jan. 14, 2013, at 2; 
The State of M&A Standstills in Delaware, Client Alert (Hunton & 
Williams LLP), Jan. 2013; Trevor S. Norwitz, Igor Kirman & William 
Savitt, “Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive Standstills” Revisited (Rapidly), CLS 
Blue Sky Blog (Jan. 9, 2013), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/
2013/01/09/dont-ask-dont-waive-standstills-revisited-rapidly/; William 
Savitt, Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive Standstills, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. 
Governance & Fin. Reg. (Dec. 18, 2012, 8:51 AM), http://blogs.law.
harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/12/18/dont-ask-dont-waive-standstills/. 
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analyze how the Delaware courts are likely to address some open 
issues involving standstills.15 My analysis assumed, however, the 
continued existence of standstills as they are currently being utilized 
in most M&A transactions and did not address the fundamental 
issues of the extent to which boards may use standstills to restrict the 
sales process or protect an executed deal.16  
This Article addresses these fundamental issues by applying 
auction theory to critique and evaluate the role of standstills in M&A 
transactions. Auction theory is an applied branch of economics used 
to design optimal bidding procedures and revenue-enhancing sales 
processes. The application of auction theory to standstills is 
particularly well suited because targets require the execution of 
standstills based on the assumption that standstills help to increase 
value during the sales process. Despite deal makers’ assumption that 
standstills are revenue enhancing, legal scholars have not used auction 
theory to examine standstills and test this assumption until now.  
In applying auction theory to standstills, this Article makes a 
unique contribution to M&A legal scholarship by providing answers 
to some fundamental questions presented by every sale of corporate 
control. Part I of this Article describes auction theory as it relates to 
the M&A sales process. Part II describes the use of standstills in the 
typical M&A sales process. Part III details a target board’s fiduciary 
duties in the context of a sale of corporate control and explores the 
typical sales processes used by public companies. Part IV details 
Delaware cases addressing the need for and possible enforcement of 
various standstills. Part V uses auction theory and recent Delaware 
cases to develop a new framework for deal makers and courts, taking 
into consideration the amount of presigning shopping done by the 
target board. Among other things, this new framework suggests that 
if deal makers continue using certain more restrictive standstills, then 
they should pair them with a minimal fiduciary out and a staggered 
termination fee. 
I. Auction Theory and Standstills  
There is a substantial body of literature on auction theory 
generally and an increasing amount of literature on auction theory in 
the M&A context. Little of this literature specifically focuses on deal-
protection devices, and none of it explicitly addresses the use of 
standstills in the auction process. This Article addresses this gap and 
 
15. See generally Sautter, supra note 7, at 936 (outlining the article’s 
discussion of a target board’s ability to consider a third party’s superior 
offer made in contravention of a standstill; a board’s promise not to 
waive a standstill; and a board’s ability to grant a winning bidder the 
right to enforce a previously executed standstill against a losing bidder).  
16. See id. at 992–93. 
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uses auction theory to propose a new framework for the use of 
standstills in change-of-control transactions.  
Academics have used auction theory to attempt to design sales 
processes that produce optimal revenue-maximizing auctions.17 
Auction theory is “develop[ing] rapidly, and is increasingly being 
looked to for assistance in practical applications,” but current auction 
theory is by no means complete.18 One practical application that may 
have the greatest impact is in the M&A field, which undoubtedly 
contains one of the largest markets for auctions. Given the size of any 
typical M&A transaction and corporate fiduciary duties, there are few 
areas that could benefit more from an optimal sales process. And if 
auction theory could be used to design optimal auctions in M&A 
transactions, then theoretically the outcome of an auction should be 
controllable largely through the structure of the sales process. Yet 
while it is an admirable goal, controlling the outcome of a sales 
process by designing an optimal structure is likely not an achievable 
goal for intricate M&A transactions.19 This is largely because many 
factors can impact the results of any given sales process, and it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to predict or control for these factors.20  
Despite these limitations, there is much from auction theory that 
can be applied to M&A transactions. Part I.A begins by discussing 
the impact of bidder type on auction results, and Part I.B follows by 
discussing the role played by information and auction theorists’ 
suggested strategies to obtain optimal auction results. As discussed in 
Part V, both of these factors—bidder type and information flow—are 
relevant to the purpose and proper use of standstills.  
A. Common-Value Versus Private-Value Sales Processes 
Auction theorists have pointed to the type of bidders involved in 
a sales process as one of the many factors impacting the ultimate 
results of the process.21 Although real-world M&A auctions tend to 
 
17. See generally Paul Klemperer, Auction Theory: A Guide to the 
Literature, 13 J. Econ. Survs. 227 (1999) (providing a survey of 
auction theory and discussing optimal auction design). 
18. Id. at 248. 
19. But see Steven J. Brams & Joshua R. Mitts, Mechanism Design in 
M&A Auctions, 38 Del. J. Corp. L. 873, 884 (2014) (disagreeing with 
the assertion that an optimal M&A auction cannot be designed).  
20. See Klemperer, supra note 17, at 234–47 (discussing many factors that 
impact auctions). 
21. E.g., Povel & Singh, supra note 11, at 1399–1400 (discussing the 
reduced competition that can result from unequally informed bidders, 
particularly because less-informed bidders are more concerned with “the 
winner’s curse” of beating a better-informed bidder but regrettably 
overpaying for the target).  
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include both financial and strategic buyers,22 auction theorists usually 
address each type of bidder separately.23 Thus, an article relying on 
auction theory would be remiss if it did not address the differences 
between these two bidders and resulting auction types.  
When financial buyers are the bidders in an auction, academics 
tend to define those auctions as common-value auctions.24 A common-
value auction is an auction in which all of the participants have the 
same or very similar value for the target.25 This is the case with 
financial buyers because they can “exploit the same sources of gains 
(e.g., cost cutting, financial restructuring).”26 Conversely, a private-
value auction is one in which each bidder has a certain value it is 
willing to pay but is not aware of the value other bidders are willing 
to pay.27 Strategic, or trade, buyers are often interested in acquiring a 
target company to optimize possible unique synergies between the 
buyer and the target.28 Thus, strategic buyers tend to have differing 
values for a target based on the value each individual strategic buyer 
places on those particular synergies.29 Therefore, auction processes 
involving strategic bidders tend to be private-value auctions.30 One 
exception to this general rule occurs if the target’s management has 
teamed up with a financial buyer to engage in a management-led 
buyout (“MBO”); then, the MBO team likely has better information 
regarding the target’s value than the typical financial buyer.31 In such 
a case, the bidding process resembles the private-value auction.  
 
22. Gorbenko & Malenko, supra note 3 (Apr. 2014 manuscript at 1) (“The 
set of bidders [for an M&A takeover auction] is comprised of two 
groups: strategic and financial.”). 
23. E.g., Jeremy Bulow, Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, Toeholds and 
Takeovers, 107 J. Pol. Econ. 427, 428 (1999) (acknowledging the 
difference between strategic and financial bidders but focusing their 
analysis on cases involving the latter). But see Gorbenko & Malenko, 
supra note 3 (Apr. 2014 manuscript at 1–2) (analyzing the differences 
between financial and strategic bidders’ valuations of target companies); 
Povel & Singh, supra note 11, at 1340 (“Unlike the existing 
literature . . . , our model allows for both private value and common 
value bidding environments.”). 
24. E.g., Bulow, Huang & Klemperer, supra note 23, at 428. 
25. J. Russel Denton, Note, Stacked Deck: Go-Shops and Auction Theory, 
60 Stan. L. Rev. 1529, 1534 (2008). 
26. Povel & Singh, supra note 11, at 1400.  
27. Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, A Theory of Auctions and 
Competitive Bidding, 50 Econometrica 1089, 1090 (1982). 
28. Povel & Singh, supra note 11, at 1400. 
29. Denton, supra note 25, at 1535.  
30. See Povel & Singh, supra note 11, at 1400.  
31. Id. at 1399.  
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The types of bidders involved in an auction impact the auction 
results because strategic and financial bidders tend to value targets in 
systematically different ways.32 Generally, strategic bidders are more 
likely to pay more “for targets with higher investment opportunities, 
as proxied by [research and development] expenditures and cash 
balances.”33 Conversely, financial bidders are more likely to pay more 
relative to market value for underperforming companies, a 
characteristic “reflected in substantial negative cash flows.”34 
The differing valuations between strategic and financial bidders 
arise from the differences in information between these general types 
of bidders who “are not always equally well informed” as well as from 
the type of information upon which each group tends to rely.35 In fact, 
“[a] key feature of auctions is the presence of asymmetric information. 
(With perfect information most auction models are relatively easy to 
solve).”36 Of course, strategic bidders and buyers engaged in an MBO 
have asymmetric information because each bidder uses its own private 
information to value the object of the auction.37 That is, strategic 
bidders have superior information on the target either due to their 
status as insiders or due to how they value the company based on 
particular synergies. In fact, strategic bidders “are less tied to 
observable[ ] [characteristics]” like financial statements or market 
indicators and demonstrate greater variation on the “unobserved 
valuation component.”38 
Financial bidders can also have asymmetric information.39 While 
their actual value of the target is the same—at least theoretically 
after the fact—each bidder has different private information about 
what the value actually is.40 For example, in the case of a corporation, 
while the value of the underlying assets should produce the same 
returns for any financial buyer in the long run, the bidder’s valuation 
estimates of those future returns may differ. But, as Professors 
 
32. Gorbenko & Malenko, supra note 3 (Apr. 2014 manuscript at 2) (arguing 
that “strategic and financial bidders appear to be inherently very 
different” and, in particular, that “a significant subset of targets is 
systematically valued more by financial bidders”).  
33. Id. at 4.  
34. Id.  
35. Povel & Singh, supra note 11, at 1399.  
36. Klemperer, supra note 17, at 229. 
37. Denton, supra note 25, at 1535. 
38. Gorbenko & Malenko, supra note 3 (Apr. 2014 manuscript at 6) (“[T]he 
estimated standard deviation of [strategic bidders’] unobserved valuation 
component is almost twice as high as that of financial bidders.”).  
39. Povel & Singh, supra note 11, at 1405. 
40. Klemperer, supra note 17, at 229–30. 
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Gorbenko and Malenko explain in their forthcoming article, Strategic 
and Financial Bidders in Takeover Auctions, financial bidders’ 
valuations tend to be based on “observable target and economy-wide 
characteristics.”41 Thus, the end result is that, unlike strategic 
bidders, financial bidders’ valuations “appear to be more 
interchangeable than strategic bidders from the target’s point of 
view.”42 But if a financial bidder already owns a similar company, the 
financial bidder would resemble a strategic bidder because it would be 
able to derive certain synergies from the purchase of the target.  
Even granting these distinctions in the real world of M&A deal 
making, the classification of an auction as a pure common-value one 
or a pure private-value one is not necessarily accurate. As previously 
mentioned, typical M&A transactions include a mix of both financial 
and strategic bidders. Moreover, “[a]ctual bidders rarely have 
identical valuations for an auctioned object nor are their valuations 
completely uncorrelated.”43 As Professor Subramanian recognized in 
his book, Negotiauctions, “[e]ven with a seemingly pure private-value 
asset, there is a significant common-value element.”44 Thus, 
information will not be perfectly symmetric among all buyers because, 
even if they are all using the same information about the target 
company, each bidder evaluates that information differently. In these 
situations involving asymmetric bidders, Professors Povel and Singh 
argue that “more biased procedures” should be used in the sale 
process, including deal-protection devices.45 
B. Information in the Sales Process 
The unique interpretation of information each bidder brings to 
the sales table impacts the question of whether standstills enhance the 
bidding process. This uniqueness is especially relevant because 
standstills are inextricably tied to the provision of information. 
Numerous auction theorists have explored the role of information in 
the sales process, and some have proposed strategies to manage the 
flow and asymmetry of information in auctions. While there are 
several unaccounted-for factors that impact M&A transactions, one 
auction-theory proposal comes close to meeting the needs of M&A 
deals.  
 
41. Gorbenko & Malenko, supra note 3 (Apr. 2014 manuscript at 5–6).  
42. Id. at 6.  
43. Peter Cramton & Alan Schwartz, Using Auction Theory to Inform 
Takeover Regulation, 7 J.L. Econ. & Org. 27, 29 (1991). 
44. Guhan Subramanian, Negotiauctions: New Dealmaking 
Strategies for a Competitive Marketplace 93 (2010).  
45. Povel & Singh, supra note 11, at 1417. 
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Professors Bulow and Klemperer have found that “contrary to our 
usual instinct that auctions are profitable because they are efficient, it 
is precisely the inefficiency of the auction—that entry into it is 
relatively ill-informed and therefore leads to a more random 
outcome—that makes it more profitable for the seller.”46 Once bidders 
have entered the auction, Professors Boone and Mulherin have found 
there is a fine line that targets must walk when revealing proprietary 
information to bidders. In particular, receiving proprietary 
information causes bidders to be more certain about their valuation of 
the company and, in turn, bid higher.47 At the same time, however, a 
target’s provision of confidential information can “reduce the inherent 
value of the selling firm” because losing bidders can “gain knowledge 
that confers competitive advantages.”48 As a result, a seller’s 
management of the sales process, limiting the number and kind of 
bidders and otherwise managing the process to reduce information 
costs, can “actually create value.”49 
Some have argued, based on the Revenue Equivalence Theorem, 
or the logic of marginal revenue versus marginal cost, that even by 
taking into account asymmetric information, an optimal auction, in 
theory, can be created.50 This particular theorem states that the 
auction type does not influence the revenue produced by an auction, 
regardless of the information each bidder has.51 Under the theorem, 
“all the ‘standard’ auctions . . . yield the same expected revenue 
under the stated conditions, as do many non-standard auctions.”52 
However, this theory “appl[ies] very generally” and rests on a number 
of assumptions, including that bidders are risk neutral; that bidders’ 
private information is independent of competitors’ private 
information; and that bidders’ private values are drawn from a 
 
46. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer 
Auctions?, 99 Am. Econ. Rev. 1544, 1546 (2009). 
47. Audra L. Boone & J. Harold Mulherin, Is There One Best Way to Sell a 
Company? Auctions Versus Negotiations and Controlled Sales, 21 J. 
Applied Corp. Fin. 28, 33 (2009) (“[W]hen bidding companies are 
confident that their own offers will not be trumped by that of 
‘uninformed’ and perhaps overly aggressive bidders, they are likely to 
offer to pay higher prices . . . .”).  
48. Id. at 34; see also Justin Pettit et al., Roundtable Discussion: Auctions 
in the M&A Process, Financier Worldwide, Nov. 2007, available at 
http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/Auctions_in_the_M%26A_Proc
ess.pdf (“The seller in an auction risks opening itself up to tactical 
investigation by competitors.”). 
49. Boone & Mulherin, supra note 47, at 28. 
50. Klemperer, supra note 17, at 232–33. 
51. Id. at 232. 
52. Id. 
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common distribution.53 But more recent developments have suggested 
that standard auctions cannot be optimal in the presence of bidder 
asymmetry and that an increase in bidder asymmetry can hurt the 
seller if it uses a standard auction.54 
Even if optimal auctions could be created by varying these 
assumptions,55 many other factors can influence the outcome of an 
auction, and most models have not been extended to completely 
account for these effects.56 Unaccounted-for factors include the entry 
costs and number of bidders; the ability of bidders to collude; and the 
divisibility of the unit for sale in the auction, or multiunit auctions.57 
The idea of a multiunit auction or the divisibility of a business into 
separate units is generally not examined in auction-theory literature.58 
However, this singular focus may be misplaced when using auction-
theory literature to interpret M&A transactions because of the large 
number of divisible assets comprising a business. Of the literature 
that does focus on multiunit auctions, the “main message . . . is that 
it is very hard to achieve efficient outcomes.”59 Furthermore, most 
existing auction-theory literature only allows for the case of either 
private-value or common-value bidding environments—that is, an 
auction that only contains either financial or strategic buyers, but not 
both.60 But the likelihood of such distinct classifications is not 
realistic.61  
Nonetheless, at least one proposal has been made, by Professors 
Povel and Singh, setting forth a “simple and realistic” optimal selling 
procedure to incorporate these asymmetries that could be particularly 
applicable to M&A transactions.62 Their model of a sequential-selling 
procedure “requires commitment to its rules, and deal-protection 
 
53. Id. at 232, 236.  
54. Povel & Singh, supra note 11, at 1403. 
55. See Klemperer, supra note 17, at 234–36 (summarizing auction-theory 
literature finding that optimal auctions can be created in some cases 
regardless of assumptions). 
56. See id. at 234–47 (discussing the implications of various factors on the 
results of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem, making creation of 
efficient optimal auctions difficult). 
57. Id. at 238–243. 
58. Id. at 240 (“Most auction theory . . . restricts attention to the sale of a 
single indivisible unit.”). 
59. Id. at 243. 
60. Povel & Singh, supra note 11, at 1400. 
61. Gorbenko & Malenko, supra note 3 (Apr. 2014 manuscript at 21–22). 
62. Povel & Singh, supra note 11, at 1400. 
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devices [to] help the target cement this commitment.”63 But as 
Professor Subramanian has pointed out:  
Auctions in the real world are messy. The rules are unclear 
and constantly changing. Price is just one of the many terms 
to be decided. The seller is not a passive participant after 
establishing the rules of the game. All of these real-world 
factors violate the fundamental assumptions on which much of 
auction theory is based.64  
In the present state of auction theory, even if Professors Povel and 
Singh’s model allowed for an optimal selling procedure in real-world 
M&A deals, the model likely could not do so alone. Some other 
structural-protection device would be needed to ensure the best 
bidding process and optimal outcomes. 
II. Standstills in the Sales Process  
One structural-protection device used in the vast majority of 
public-company sales is the standstill. Standstills generally prevent 
potential buyers from engaging in activity that may be considered 
hostile to the target. More specifically, “a standstill agreement will 
prohibit a hostile bid in any form, including a tender offer to acquire 
stock control of the other contracting party and/or a proxy contest to 
replace all or some of its directors.”65 Although standstills can be 
standalone agreements, most appear as a provision in a confidentiality 
agreement. Despite the close affiliation between standstill agreements 
and confidentiality agreements, the two agreements serve vitally 
different functions. Specifically, the confidentiality agreement is 
intended to prevent the use or disclosure of nonpublic information, 
whereas the standstill is intended to regulate the manner in which a 
party may gain control over the target.66 Along these lines, 
“[s]tandstill prohibitions do not require, or in any way depend upon, a 
contracting party’s use or disclosure of the other party’s confidential, 
nonpublic information.”67 At the same time, the main purpose of 
including a standstill in a confidentiality agreement is to prevent the 
buyer from having an “informational advantage over other 
prospective bidders resulting from its review of confidential 
 
63. Id. at 1425. 
64 . Subramanian, supra note 44, at 119. 
65. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 68 A.3d 1208, 
1219 (Del. 2012). 
66. Id. at 1219. 
67. Id.  
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information.”68 Hence, standstills give “teeth” to confidentiality 
agreements that alone may not be enough to establish insider-trading 
liability under current federal securities laws.69  
Standstills have been described as the “cost of entry” into 
discussions with a target.70 In fact, some, if not most, targets will 
refuse to proceed with negotiations if the bidder refuses to execute the 
standstill.71 The standstill “serves as a kind of litmus test, an 
indication of the bidder’s true intentions.”72 A bidder can “try to 
modify the standstill as much as [it] can,” but by executing the 
standstill the bidder is forsaking its “ability to launch an unsolicited 
offer.”73 
Because standstills work to restrict bidders, the duration of these 
restrictions can become a significant issue during negotiations. 
Typically, “auction-style standstill agreements last only one or two 
years, on the basis that the confidential information to be provided to 
the bidders will have useful currency for only a relatively short 
time.”74 Standstills can be longer than a year and even up to five 
years, but generally standstills “with expirations between six months 
and one year are not uncommon; although, one year may be the 
norm.”75 For example, one commonly negotiated aspect of a standstill  
68. William J. Carney, Mergers and Acquisitions: Cases and 
Materials 157 (3d ed. 2011).  
69. See Ryan M. Davis, Note, Trimming the “Judicial Oak”: 
Rule 10b5-2(b)(1), Confidentiality Agreements, and the Proper Scope of 
Insider Trading Liability, 63 Vand. L. Rev. 1469, 1486 (2010) (“[This 
Note] finds that liability cannot be based on confidentiality agreements 
alone, for although the [United States] Supreme Court has been willing 
to stretch the duty requirement in the past, the Court has always 
required more than a duty to keep information in confidence.”).  
70. Interview with Steve Wolitzer, Global Head of Mergers & Acquisitions, 
Lehman Brothers, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (June 4, 2003), quoted in Guhan 
Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 
113 Yale L.J. 621, 660 (2003).  
71. See Nicole E. Clark, Preliminary Agreements, in Doing Deals 2009: 
Understanding the Nuts & Bolts of Transactional Practice 
73, 80–81 (2009) (stating that a target generally asks a bidder to 
execute a standstill in exchange for confidential information); Meryl S. 
Rosenblatt, Letters of Intent and Exclusivity, Confidentiality and 
Standstill Agreements, in Drafting Corporate Agreements 2002–
2003, at 95, 117 (2002) (noting that a target may require a standstill to 
ensure that the buyer remains committed to the transaction and to 
prevent the buyer from pursuing a hostile alternative). 
72. Bruce Wasserstein, Big Deal: Mergers and Acquisitions in the 
Digital Age 689 (2000). 
73. Subramanian, supra note 70, at 662. 
74. Lawlor, supra note 5, at 12.  
75. Sautter, supra note 7, at 948 (citing Subramanian, supra note 70, at 660). 
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is whether the standstill will include a fall-away provision. One 
practitioner described a fall-away provision as an “escape hatch” for a 
buyer.76 A fall-away provision provides that the standstill restrictions 
would no longer apply if another bidder not bound by a standstill 
makes an offer for the target or if the target executes a definitive 
acquisition agreement with another bidder.77 A target may resist this 
provision fearing it may prevent the bidder from submitting its best 
offer during the presigning sales process.78 But targets often end up 
agreeing to the fall-away provision as a way of moving along the sales 
process.79 Moreover, targets recognize the possibility that a fall-away 
provision ultimately may result in the target realizing a greater sales 
price.80 Nevertheless, some practitioners argue that whether a target 
should agree to a fall-away standstill is context specific. For example, 
if the target has decided that it “is going to run a process that’s going 
to end in a sale,” a target may be more willing to agree to a fall-away 
provision.81 As is evident from the foregoing, whether a standstill falls 
away is often a matter of some debate and can directly impact the 
ultimate price received. 
Another debatable matter among practitioners and judges is the 
viability and enforceability of Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive (DADW) 
standstills. DADW standstills are actually a form of standstill 
restriction that emanate from two different contracts.82 First, the 
“Don’t Ask” portion of the restriction comes from a provision in the 
standstill itself that prevents a potential bidder who executed the 
standstill from requesting a waiver of the standstill.83 Second, the 
“Don’t Waive” portion of the restriction comes from a provision in 
the merger agreement that prevents a target board from granting a 
 
76. Richard E. Climan et al., Negotiating Acquisitions of Public Companies 
in Transactions Structured as Friendly Tender Offers, 116 Penn St. L. 
Rev. 615, 645 (2012) (transcribed panel discussion). 
77. Id.  
78. Savitt, supra note 14 (“Sellers usually resist fall-aways both to prevent 
bidders from holding back and to induce them, by promising certainty, 
to put their best offer on the table.”).  
79. See Climan, supra note 76, at 647 (describing a “fall-away trigger that 
[targets] often just agree to, because people start to get ossified in their 
positions”).  
80. Id. (“At the end of the day, if you have what you think is the highest 
price in an auction, it’s not a bad thing that [the bidder] wants to come 
in and put more money on the table.”).  
81. Id. 
82. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive” Restrictions in Standstill 
Agreements, Prac. L. (July 11, 2013), http://us.practicallaw.com/2-534-
1026?source=rss. 
83. Id. 
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waiver of a preexisting standstill.84 Because these restrictions may 
hinder a board’s ability to fully exercise its fiduciary duties, DADW 
standstills have become the subject of much current-day debate.  
III. Fiduciary Duties and M&A Sale Processes  
In analyzing standstills and their related subprovisions, auction 
theory cannot be considered in a vacuum, as there are other 
significant considerations in the context of a sale of a publicly traded, 
Delaware corporation. Namely, a well-developed body of Delaware 
case law governing a target board’s fiduciary duties significantly 
influences such sales. Moreover, there is the practical consideration 
regarding the processes by which targets actually go about selling 
themselves. Part III.A first details the fiduciary duties applicable to a 
target board’s actions in a sale of corporate control. Then Part III.B 
describes the various sales methods upheld by Delaware courts and 
available to a target board. The role of standstills in each sale method 
is emphasized. 
A. Fiduciary Duties in a Sale of Corporate Control 
The seminal Delaware Supreme Court case of Revlon Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.85 provides that once a sale of 
corporate control becomes inevitable, “a board’s primary duty 
becomes that of an auctioneer responsible for selling the company to 
the highest bidder.”86 Since this holding, the Delaware Supreme Court 
has recognized that “no single blueprint” exists for a board to satisfy 
its Revlon duties.87 The courts have acknowledged that not every sale 
requires a full-blown auction process but rather the board of directors 
of a selling corporation must meet “a reasonableness standard.”88 
Moreover, in selecting an acquirer and rejecting other offers, boards 
are not bound to make that decision solely based on the price being 
offered. Instead, the target board may consider a variety of factors, 
including the offer’s terms and feasibility, financing, the likelihood of 
consummation of the proposed transaction, and “the bidder’s identity, 
 
84. Id.  
85. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
86. Id. at 184. 
87. Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989).  
88. Transcript of Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 88, 
Steinhardt v. Howard-Anderson, C.A., No. 5878-VCL (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 
2011); see also Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286 (“Revlon does not demand 
that every change in the control of a Delaware corporation be preceded 
by a heated bidding contest.”).  
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prior background and other business venture experiences.”89 Along 
these lines, deal certainty is of primary importance, and it is not 
uncommon for targets to choose a lower-priced bid over a higher-
priced one based on closing certainty. Furthermore, just because a 
company is in Revlon mode does not prevent a target’s board “from 
offering bidders deal protections, so long as its decision to do so was 
reasonably directed to the objective of getting the highest price, and 
not” a self-dealing goal “to tilt the playing field towards a particular 
bidder for reasons unrelated to the stockholders’ ability to get top 
dollar.”90 
A board’s decision to offer deal protections to bidders is subject to 
the Unocal91/Unitrin92 enhanced-scrutiny analysis as described in the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS 
Healthcare, Inc.93 The Unocal/Unitrin enhanced-scrutiny standard 
involves a two-step analysis, the first step of which involves the board 
showing that it “had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger 
to corporate policy and effectiveness existed.”94 Under the second step, 
the court first determines whether the deal-protection devices are 
“preclusive” or “coercive.”95 Once the court determines that the deal 
protections are neither coercive nor preclusive, the court examines the 
“range of reasonableness” of the board’s decision.96  
In explicitly extending the Unocal/Unitrin enhanced-scrutiny 
analysis to deal-protection devices, the majority in Omnicare stated: 
Defensive devices taken to protect a merger agreement executed 
by a board of directors are intended to give that agreement an 
advantage over any subsequent transactions that materialize 
 
89. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1282 n.29 
(Del. 1988).  
90. In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1000–01 (Del. Ch. 
2005) (citing Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1286). 
91. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
92.  Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
93. 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003). In Omnicare, the Delaware Supreme Court 
applied the Unocal/Unitrin enhanced scrutiny to deal protections in a 
non-change-of-control transaction. Id. at 931–32. Similarly, in Toys “R” 
Us, Inc., the Delaware Court of Chancery applied the Unocal/Unitrin 
enhanced scrutiny to termination fees in a change-of-control transaction. 
877 A.2d at 1016. 
94. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 935 (quoting Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
95. Id. (quoting Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
96. Id. at 931–32 (quoting Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1387–88) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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before the merger is approved by the stockholders and 
consummated. This is analogous to the favored treatment that a 
board of directors may properly give to encourage an initial 
bidder when it discharges its fiduciary duties under Revlon.97 
Thus, in a change-of-control transaction, the board’s decision to enter 
into a merger agreement with a particular bidder and the process 
leading up to the merger agreement are subject to the Revlon 
standard, while the deal protections are subject to the Unocal/Unitrin 
enhanced-scrutiny standard as described in Omnicare.98  
B. M&A Sales Processes 
The Delaware courts have upheld a variety of sale methods as 
meeting the Revlon reasonableness standard. This section explores the 
typical sales methods used in a sale of corporate control and upheld 
by the Delaware courts: a classic public auction, presigning market 
canvass, negotiated acquisition, and postsigning market checks. 
Although this Article addresses each of these sale methods on an 
individual basis, many targets may use a combination of two or more 
of these methods in any one transaction. 
1. Classic Full-Blown Auction 
The classic full-blown auction is generally thought to be the 
simplest way for a board to ensure satisfaction of its fiduciary duties 
presigning.99 Not only is a classic auction thought to be the easiest 
way to prove compliance with fiduciary duties but, as Professors 
 
97. Id. at 932 (emphasis added).  
98. See Steven M. Davidoff & Christina M. Sautter, Lock-Up Creep, 38 J. 
Corp. L. 681, 685 n.24, 703 n.98 (2013) (describing the Delaware Court 
of Chancery’s use of the Unocal standard of review for deal-protection 
devices in Revlon transactions).  
99. See Wasserstein, supra note 72, at 746 (“A wide-ranging auction 
generally maximizes value, particularly since the ‘best buyer’ on paper is 
not always the party who eventually pays the highest price.”); Samuel 
C. Thompson, Mergers, Acquisitions and Tender Offers 5-205 
(PLI electronic ed. rel. 4 Sept. 2012) (2010) (recognizing the best way to 
sell publicly held companies may be through “active and fair auction[s]” 
and stating that “[a]ctual market testing through an auction may be 
more beneficial than relying solely on investment bankers to assess 
valuation”); Pettit et al., supra note 48 (“The basics of what sellers are 
looking for in an auction remain the same: maximum price, high 
certainty of completing the transaction and management’s preferred 
buyer.”); see also Christina M. Sautter, Shopping During Extended 
Store Hours: From No Shops to Go-Shops The Development, 
Effectiveness, and Implications of Go-Shop Provisions in Change of 
Control Transactions, 73 Brook. L. Rev. 525, 576 (2008) (noting 
Delaware courts consider public auctions or presigning targeted market 
canvasses to be value-maximization procedures).  
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Bulow and Klemperer found in a recent study, “the straightforward, 
level-playing-field competition that an auction creates is usually more 
profitable for a seller than a sequential process.”100 However, in 
another study of 400 takeovers of U.S. corporations during the 1990s, 
Professors Boone and Mulherin found that there were not substantial 
differences between the wealth effects resulting from auctions versus 
those resulting from negotiations.101 Despite finding that auctions were 
not necessarily better at maximizing stockholder value than 
negotiations, Professors Boone and Mulherin found that half of the 
400 takeovers studied resulted from an auction process.102 Thus, the 
auction process is certainly a popular form of sale even if business 
scholars debate whether it is more beneficial to stockholders than 
negotiations.  
Generally, the auction begins with the preparation of an offering 
memorandum describing in detail the target’s business.103 At the same 
time the offering memorandum is being prepared, the target’s 
financial advisor creates a list of potential purchasers.104 The financial 
advisor then contacts the potential purchasers, and those potential 
buyers who express an interest in the target are required to execute a 
confidentiality agreement before being given the offering 
memorandum and, in some cases, other information.105 In most deals, 
the confidentiality agreement will contain a standstill.106 Thus, auction 
participants enter the auction process without first determining the 
value of the company and without knowing what other bidders will 
 
100. Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 46, at 1545. 
101. Audra L. Boone & J. Harold Mulherin, How are Firms Sold?, 62 J. 
Finance. 847, 871 (2007).  
102. Id. at 869. 
103. Wasserstein, supra note 72, at 746.  
104. Id. at 746; see also Robert G. Hansen, Auctions of Companies, 
39 Econ. Inquiry 30, 30 (2001) (stating that a potential-bidder list 
likely includes “competitors, suppliers, customers, and acquisition-
oriented conglomerates or leveraged buyout houses”).  
105. Wasserstein, supra note 72, at 746.  
106. Climan, supra note 76, at 637.  
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bid.107 It is this lack of knowledge that Professors Bulow and 
Klemperer contend enhance value maximization in an auction.108  
At a predetermined date pursuant to the target’s bidding 
procedures, the interested bidders are required to submit a 
preliminary, nonbinding indication of interest.109 These indications of 
interest “will be either a number or a range of numbers that are 
supposed to represent ‘bidders’ first approximations of their estimates 
of value of the target.’”110 The target and its financial advisor usually 
then narrow the field of bidders based on the prices contained in the 
indications of interest and other factors.111 At this point, the narrowed 
field of bidders is asked to participate in a second round of bidding.112 
This is usually the point at which the target’s management will hold 
presentations for the bidders, the bidders will receive access to either 
an online or physical data room to perform due diligence, and plant or 
site visits will occur.113 In some cases, bidders will be expected to 
complete their due diligence reviews before final bids are submitted.114 
Thus, the final bids will not be subject to satisfactory completion of 
due diligence.115 In addition, the target will send the final bidders a 
 
107. Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 46, at 1545. A prominent investment 
banker, Bruce Wasserstein, explained, “The auction format naturally 
creates tension—especially the blind auction, in which bidders are not 
told how many other parties they are competing against. . . . If the 
auctioneer is able and the integrity of the process is maintained, even a 
single bidder can be induced to enter a ‘full’ bid.” Wasserstein, supra 
note 72, at 748 (emphasis added).  
108. Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 46, at 1546 (“[C]ontrary to our usual 
instinct that auctions are profitable because they are efficient, it is 
precisely the inefficiency of the auction—that entry into it is relatively 
ill-informed and therefore leads to a more random outcome—that makes 
it more profitable for the seller.”); see also Afra Afsharipour, A 
Shareholders’ Put Option: Counteracting the Acquirer Overpayment 
Problem, 96 Minn. L. Rev. 1018, 1041 (2012) (“First, since a target’s 
real value is unknown at the time of the acquisition, ‘habitually 
optimistic [managers are] therefore likely to overestimate a target’s 
value.’ Second, managers may overpay because they are ignorant of 
bidding theory and are vulnerable to the ‘winner’s curse.’ Thus, on 
average, for an asset whose value is unknown, the winning bid is the one 
that overestimates the value of the asset.”) (citations omitted). 
109. Wasserstein, supra note 72, at 746. 
110. Hansen, supra note 104, at 31. 
111. Wasserstein, supra note 72, at 747. 
112. Id. 
113. Id.; Hansen, supra note 104, at 31. 
114. Wasserstein, supra note 72, at 747. 
115. See id. (noting that in certain instances the bid winner is announced on 
the final bid date). 
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sample purchase agreement that the final bidders will mark up and 
return with their offers on the final bid date.116  
The auction winner is chosen based in large part on the offer 
price, but other factors, including the purchase-agreement mark ups, 
can play a significant role.117 For example, financing, antitrust issues, 
closing certainty, and reverse termination fees are just some of the 
factors that targets may consider in choosing an auction winner.118 
Generally, these auctions are “sealed-bid” auctions, meaning that the 
bidders do not know the terms of the other bidders’ bids, and the 
final bids remain final.119 However, some auctions are “dripping wax” 
auctions in which the purportedly “‘final bids’ are not actually 
final.”120 In such an auction, the “seller goes back to the few highest 
bidders, with the high bid used as leverage over the others in an 
attempt to force a raise. If successful, the new prices can be used 
against the former high bidder.”121  
As Wasserstein has noted, an auction’s success depends in large 
part on how the auction is run, with an emphasis on the selective 
release of information during the auction process.122 Although the 
information provided to bidders in the offering memorandum and 
through due diligence “is extensive, it is not complete.”123 Thus, 
bidders will likely have asymmetric information largely based on how 
 
116. Id.  
117. See id. (stating that “[p]rice often is the determining factor in an 
auction” and that differentiating between bidders who have submitted 
“unfavorable contract[s]” versus bidders who have submitted “‘clean’” 
contracts can also play a crucial role); see also Jack & Suzy Welch, Op-
Ed, Why Joe Biden is Wrong About Private Equity Execs, Fortune, 
July 2, 2012, at 42 (“Usually several firms are vying for the business, 
but it’s not accurate to assume that price is the sole determinant of who 
wins. Just as critical many times is a [private equity] firm’s ability to 
bring contentious stakeholders to a shared vision of the future. The 
result is that private equity managers are experienced in the art of 
getting tough deals done.”).  
118. See In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 72 (Del. Ch. 2007) 
(listing such factors as reasons to deny the bidder continued friendly 
negotiations); see also Wasserstein, supra note 72, at 747 (“[O]ne 
bidder might offer a high price, an unfavorable contract, and no 
concrete details regarding financing. Another bidder might be willing to 
pay less, but offer a ‘clean’ contract and quick closure.”).  
119. Wasserstein, supra note 72, at 747.  
120. Id. 
121. Id.  
122. See id. at 748 (“If the process is managed correctly, bidders will be 
pulled along by the desire for more data.”). 
123. Hansen, supra note 104, at 32. As Professor Hansen states, “Throughout 
the auction process, potential buyers may ask for information that the 
selling company will view as too confidential to reveal.” Id. 
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the bidders interpret the information provided to them in the due 
diligence period as well as based on the preexisting information 
already in their possession.  
Although some scholars view public auctions as the best way to 
maximize stockholder value, there are certainly situations in which a 
public auction is not desirable. One such situation is when a board 
views an auction as placing the company at a competitive 
disadvantage.124 For example, if a company conducts a public auction, 
the company risks losing employees, customers, and suppliers.125 In 
addition, the company also runs the risk of being viewed by the 
market for corporate control as “damaged goods” if the auction is 
unsuccessful.126 Thus, in the event of a failed auction, it may take 
some time for a company to successfully sell itself.127 Furthermore, 
although potential bidders are required to execute confidentiality 
agreements before being provided with a confidential offering 
memorandum or commencing due diligence, companies also risk 
proprietary or sensitive information being disseminated to the public 
generally and, in particular, to competitors.128 In some cases, the 
target may have already been approached by a potential purchaser 
whose bid may be lost if the target board were to choose to engage in 
a full-blown auction.129 Another common situation in which targets 
 
124. The Delaware Court of Chancery also recognizes the potential risks involved 
with a public auction. See In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 
597 (Del. Ch. 2010) (implying leaked auctions may upset target’s employee 
base); cf. In re MONY Grp., Inc. S’holders Litig., 852 A.2d 9, 21 (Del. Ch. 
2004) (recognizing benefits of single-bidder approaches).  
125. See In re Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 597 (recognizing possible employee 
strife resulting from a leaked auction); Yanow v. Scientific Leasing, Inc., 
C.A. Nos. 9536, 9561, 1991 WL 165304, at *668–69 (Del. Ch. July 31, 
1991) (stating the board resisted an auction or market canvass fearing 
adverse effects on the target’s “relationships with its employees, 
customers and suppliers”); Steven M. Davidoff, What the Sound and 
Fury Over Best Buy May Signify, N.Y. Times Dealbook (Aug. 23, 
2012, 12:41 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/23/what-
the-sound-and-fury-over-best-buy-may-signify/ (“Typically, targets are 
quite skittish about publicly talking about negotiations. The reason is 
that this type of back and forth is unsettling for the company’s 
employees and operations.”). 
126. Pettit et al., supra note 48. 
127. See Comm. on Negotiated Acquisitions, Am. Bar Ass’n, The 
M&A Process: A Practical Guide for the Business Lawyer 94 
(2005) (detailing the disadvantages of auctions, including the length of 
time to sell a company after a failed auction).  
128. See In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 62 (Del. Ch. 2007) 
(noting a target’s “legitimate proprietary concerns” about sharing 
information with a competitor).  
129. See, e.g., id. at 70 (stating that the buyer’s bid was contingent on the 
target not conducting a public auction); In re Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 604 
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choose to forgo a public auction is when there are a limited number of 
viable potential buyers. This is typically a result of the target’s 
business type or its financial situation.130 For example, a multibillion-
dollar corporation may have a limited number of suitors due to the 
corporation’s size or the industry in which it operates.131 Hence a 
selling corporation may choose instead to engage in an informal 
auction process or to negotiate exclusively with one bidder.  
2. The Presigning Market Canvass and the Negotiated Acquisition 
Another alternative available to target companies is the 
presigning market canvass, or the informal auction. This is really a 
variation on the full-blown auction process. In this type of sale 
process, the target, or its financial advisor, contacts a number of 
potential bidders to gauge their interest in the target.132 The bidding 
process, if one does exist, is in “a less structured setting than that of a 
formal auction.”133 
The presigning market canvass may help targets avoid the 
previously discussed costs involved in a “busted” auction as well as 
the costs involved in running a full auction. Moreover, a presigning 
 
(stating that a target weighed the risk of losing a potential buyer if the 
target conducted a public auction); In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 
926 A.2d 94, 119 (Del. Ch. 2007) (discussing the risk of losing an initial 
bidder if the target engaged in a public auction and the risk an initial 
bidder would pay less if the response to the auction was “under whelming”).  
130. See Boone & Mulherin, supra note 47, at 32, 34 (“[T]he costs of 
operating auctions often imply that limiting the sales process can induce 
more aggressive bidding by those allowed to participate in the 
process. . . . The argument for a managed sales process may well be 
even stronger in corporate M&A, particularly in cases involving one or a 
few large corporate bidders with significant expected synergies with the 
seller.”); Pettit et al., supra note 48 (“Generally, auctions drive value up 
if the buyer mix is robust. . . . A targeted approach may be warranted 
when there is obvious and limited universe of buyers. . . . Whether or 
not an auction will be favoured over private negotiation will always 
depend on whether the seller is price-driven or motivated by other 
factors. Sometimes it’s clear who is going to pay the most for an asset so 
there is no real need to run an auction.”). 
131. In their research, Professors Boone and Mulherin point to the $23 billion 
Wrigley deal in 2008, pursued through one-on-one negotiations with 
Mars, and the 2008 Embarq deal with CenturyTel for $5 billion, 
resulting from a field of five potential buyers in the telecom industry, as 
examples of why large companies are more likely to sell themselves in 
one-on-one negotiations rather than auctions. Boone & Mulherin, supra 
note 47, at 30–32; see also Boone & Mulherin, supra note 101, at 870 
(“[T]he choice of an auction or a negotiation in a particular takeover is 
related to characteristics such as target size and industry . . . .”). 
132. Boone & Mulherin, supra note 101, at 851.  
133. Id.  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 2·2013 
Auction Theory and Standstills 
545 
market canvass may take place after a previously not-for-sale target 
company has been approached by a bidder or in situations where the 
target has negotiated initially with only one bidder. In any event, the 
interested potential bidders will be required to execute a 
confidentiality agreement, typically containing a standstill, before 
gaining access to the target’s private information.  
Another form of sale process is the negotiated acquisition, or 
sequential procedure. In this type of sale process, the target negotiates 
exclusively with one potential buyer.134 Like in the other sale 
processes, the potential buyer will be required to execute a 
confidentiality agreement, generally containing a standstill, prior to 
receiving the target’s confidential information. If the initial potential 
buyer is willing to pay a high enough price, then the deal will sign 
without the target contacting other potential buyers.135 In some 
scenarios, a potential buyer may condition its bid on the target not 
contacting any other potential buyers or otherwise performing a 
market canvass presigning.  
3. Relevant Merger-Agreement Deal Terms and  
Postsigning Sales Activities 
Regardless of the sales method initially chosen, “[b]ecause of [a] 
board’s fiduciary duty to consider higher bids,” an auction-like setting 
will likely result from the sales process, thus implicating auction-
theory considerations.136 No matter if the target performs an auction 
or negotiates with only one bidder, the resulting definitive merger 
agreement will be publicly announced within a day or two of 
execution.137 The merger agreement will likely contain a no-shop 
provision paired with a fiduciary out. The no-shop provision prevents 
the target company from soliciting offers between signing and 
closing.138 But the fiduciary out allows a target company’s board of 
directors to negotiate with a third party who makes an unsolicited 
offer if the third party’s offer is a superior one or if it is reasonably 
likely to become a “Superior Offer,” as that term is defined in the 
merger agreement.139 In addition, the fiduciary out allows the target 
company to terminate the existing agreement in favor of a third-party 
 
134. Povel & Singh, supra note 11, at 1400.  
135. Id.  
136. Denton, supra note 25, at 1533. 
137. Audra L. Boone & J. Harold Mulherin, Do Termination Provisions 
Truncate the Takeover Bidding Process?, 20 Rev. Fin. Stud. 461, 
475 (2007). 
138. Christina M. Sautter, Rethinking Contractual Limits on Fiduciary 
Duties, 38 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 55, 72–73 (2010). 
139. Id. at 73. 
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offer if the board determines it would be a violation of its fiduciary 
duties not to do so.140 A typical prerequisite to the target providing 
information to, and negotiating with, the overbidder is that the 
overbidder must execute a confidentiality agreement with terms that 
are no less restrictive than the initial acquirer’s confidentiality 
agreement.141 Thus, because the initial acquirer’s confidentiality 
agreement generally contains a standstill, the overbidder’s 
confidentiality agreement will likely contain a standstill.142 As will be 
detailed in Part V, the possibility exists that a target board could use 
the standstill as a means of favoring the initial acquirer over the 
overbidder.  
Recently, parties have also begun to use go-shop provisions in 
some transactions.143 Unlike a no-shop provision, a go-shop provision 
allows a target company to actively solicit third-party offers 
postsigning for a limited period of time.144 Like the no-shop provision, 
a typical go-shop provision requires bidders to execute a 
confidentiality agreement with no-less-restrictive terms than the 
 
140. Id. 
141. See Denton, supra note 25, at 1539–40 (noting that go-shop provisions 
typically require “any third-party bidder to sign an ‘Acceptable 
Confidentiality Agreement’ with the seller in order to have access to any 
material nonpublic information” and defining “Acceptable 
Confidentiality Agreement” as “any confidentiality agreement between 
the Company and any such Person existing as of the date of this 
Agreement” and “any confidentiality agreement entered into after the 
date of this Agreement that contains provisions that are no less 
favorable in the aggregate to the Company than those contained in the 
Confidentiality Agreement”); Robert Little et al., No-Shops & Fiduciary 
Outs: A Survey of 2012 Public Merger Agreements, Dallas Bar Ass’n 
2, 6 (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.dallasbar.org/system/files/dba_presentat
ion--_no-shops_and_fiduciary_outs.pdf (finding, based on data from 
fifty-three public-company merger agreements signed in 2012 with 
transaction values over $1 billion, that in almost half of the merger 
agreements an acceptable confidentiality agreement with an alternative 
bidder was one that was “no less favorable” or “not less restrictive”); 
see also Transcript of Status Conference and Motion to Expedite at 89, 
In re Transatlantic Holdings, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A., Nos. 6574-CS & 
6776-CS (Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 2011) (discussing a merger-agreement 
provision that required third-party bidders to sign a confidentiality 
agreement with a standstill no less favorable than the one between the 
merger parties and noting that it is an “accepted norm of deal 
negotiation where a merger party insists that later arriving bidders who 
are going to have a chance play by certain rules that are as stringent as 
the rules that apply to them”). 
142. See David Marcus, Confis, Standstills and the Courts, Deal 
Pipeline (Oct. 13, 2011, 2:11 PM), http://www.thedeal.com/content/re
gulatory/confis-standstills-and-the-courts.php. 
143. Sautter, supra note 99, at 555.  
144. Id. at 557. 
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initial acquirer’s confidentiality agreement, meaning the bidder will be 
subject to a standstill.145  
IV. Current Use of Standstills in M&A Transactions 
Although standstills are ubiquitous in today’s public-company 
M&A deals, to date, the Delaware courts have not extensively 
addressed the use of standstills. In fact, most of Delaware’s guidance 
on the use of standstills in M&A transactions comes through dicta. 
This Part summarizes those recent cases in which the Delaware Court 
of Chancery has commented on standstills. In addition, this Part also 
includes a description of two nonlitigated transactions in which 
standstills played a significant role in the sales process. 
A. Topps and the Impact of Standstills on the Sales Process 
The Delaware Chancery Court’s 2007 In re Topps Co. 
Shareholders Litigation146 decision provides some helpful insight on the 
role and impact of standstills in a sale of corporate control. Topps 
involved a leveraged buyout of Topps Co. by a Michael Eisner–led 
group that ensured the retention of the majority of the company’s key 
employees and senior management.147 
Although a presigning auction or market canvass was 
unacceptable under Eisner’s proposal, Eisner agreed to a go-shop 
provision.148 Thus, the merger agreement included a forty-day go-shop 
provision and “the right to accept a ‘Superior Proposal’ after that, 
subject only to Eisner’s receipt of a termination fee and his match 
right.”149 At the outset of the go-shop period, Topps’s financial 
advisor “contacted 107 potential strategic and financial bidders.”150 
The only serious bidder who emerged during the go-shop period was 
Upper Deck, a competitor of Topps. Upper Deck’s bid was for 
one dollar more per share than the Eisner proposal.151  
The Topps board met after the go-shop period expired to 
determine whether Upper Deck could continue talks past the 
 
145. See, e.g., In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 66 (Del. Ch. 
2007) (recognizing a bidder required to execute a confidentiality 
agreement containing a standstill during a go-shop period).  
146. 926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
147. Id. at 61, 73–74.  
148. Id. at 61. 
149. Id.  
150. Id. at 71. 
151. Id.  
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expiration of the go-shop period as an “Excluded Party.”152 In 
deciding that Upper Deck could not continue talks with Topps, the 
Topps board raised potential antitrust concerns and questioned Upper 
Deck’s ability to finance the deal.153 Upper Deck then made an 
unsolicited proposal and offered “to divest key licenses if required by 
antitrust regulators.”154 The Topps board again determined the 
unsolicited proposal was not a “Superior Proposal.”155 Perhaps more 
importantly for purposes of this Article, the Topps board also rejected 
Upper Deck’s request to be released from the standstill agreement, 
which prevented Upper Deck from publicly disclosing the information 
regarding its discussions with Topps and from launching a tender 
offer unconsented to by Topps’ board.156  
A group of Topps stockholders and Upper Deck moved for a 
preliminary injunction, maintaining that by refusing to release Upper 
Deck from the standstill “Topps [was] denying its stockholders the 
chance to decide for themselves whether to forsake the lower-priced 
Eisner Merger in favor of the chance to accept a tender offer from 
Upper Deck at a higher price.”157 Then–Vice Chancellor Strine, who 
has since become Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Delaware, 
began his analysis of the case by acknowledging the “legitimate 
purposes” standstills can serve, including establishing rules that 
promote an orderly auction and providing a target with leverage in its 
negotiations with potential bidders.158 Then–Vice Chancellor Strine 
acknowledged, however, that a board could use standstills for 
illegitimate purposes like “favor[ing] one bidder over another, not for 
reasons consistent with stockholder interest, but because managers 
prefer one bidder for their own motives.”159 Then–Vice Chancellor 
Strine further recognized that the Topps board’s reservation of the 
ability to waive the standstill if the board’s fiduciary duties required 
it to do so “was an important thing to do, given there was no 
 
152. Id. at 72. The Upper Deck offer was submitted only two days before the 
expiration of the go-shop period. The terms of the Topps-Eisner merger 
agreement defined an Excluded Party as “a potential bidder that the board 
considered reasonably likely to make a Superior Proposal.” Id. at 65, 71. 
153. Id. at 72. These antitrust considerations included the possibility that 
authorities might delay or prevent the transaction and Upper Deck’s 
failure to sufficiently assume the antitrust risk. Id. 
154. Id. at 90. 
155. Id. at 72.  
156. Id. at 62.  
157. Id. at 63.  
158. Id. at 91.  
159. Id.  
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shopping process before signing with Eisner.”160 Additionally, he 
recognized the board’s obligation to enforce the standstill only for 
“proper purposes.”161  
By refusing to release Upper Deck from the standstill, the Topps 
board prevented its stockholders from both accepting a potentially 
higher offer and from receiving information regarding the 
transaction.162 Moreover, the board’s refusal also precluded “Upper 
Deck from obtaining antitrust clearance.”163 As a result, then–Vice 
Chancellor Strine found that the Topps board’s enforcement of the 
standstill was “likely, after trial, to be found a breach of fiduciary 
duty.”164 Until quite recently, then–Vice Chancellor Strine’s decision 
in Topps was the leading case providing guidance on how deal makers 
may use standstills during a sale of corporate control.  
B. Potential Enforceability of DADW Standstills After Topps 
Five transactions from 2011 and 2012 provide helpful commentary 
on the potential enforceability of DADW standstills. The first two 
cases, In re Celera Corp. Shareholder Litigation165 and In re 
RehabCare Group, Inc. Shareholders Litigation,166 arose in the context 
of the Delaware Chancery Court’s approval of settlements. Thus, 
those cases simply provide dicta regarding the enforceability of 
DADW standstills. However, two significant rulings issued in the final 
months of 2012 considered DADW standstills in depth. In In re 
Complete Genomics, Inc. Shareholder Litigation,167 Vice Chancellor 
Laster invalidated a confidentiality agreement because it contained a 
DADW standstill.168 In another case, In re Ancestry.com Inc. 
Shareholder Litigation,169 then-Chancellor Strine found that the target 
board had likely breached its duty of care because of the way it 
employed a DADW standstill.170 The Court of Chancery did not weigh  
160. Id.  
161. Id.  
162. Id. at 92. 
163. Id.  
164. Id. Then–Vice Chancellor Strine stated that “Upper Deck ha[d] shown a 
reasonable probability of success on its claim that the Topps board [wa]s 
misusing the Standstill.” Id. at 91. 
165. C.A. No. 6304-VCP, 2012 WL 1020471 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012). 
166. C.A. No. 6197-VCL, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 208 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2011). 
167. C.A. No. 7888-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 2012). 
168. Telephonic Oral Argument & the Court’s Ruling at 13, Complete 
Genomics, Inc., C.A. No. 7888-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 2012). 
169. C.A. No. 7988-CS (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012). 
170. In re Ancestry.com Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7988-CS, slip op. at 
22–29 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012). 
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in on the fifth transaction, Apollo Management VII, LP and 
KSL Capital Partners, LLC’s fight for Great Wolf Resorts, Inc.171 But 
that deal provides an excellent example of the potentially erosive 
effects on shareholder value maximization that some standstills may 
have during the preclosing period.  
1. RehabCare and the Questioned Viability of DADW Standstills 
Following Topps 
From late 2007 through early 2008, RehabCare Group, Inc. and 
Kindred Healthcare, Inc. held preliminary discussions regarding 
Kindred’s possible acquisition of RehabCare.172 At that time, Kindred 
submitted a preliminary indication of interest to acquire RehabCare, 
but the discussions ended after the parties were unable to reach an 
appropriate valuation for RehabCare.173  
After RehabCare’s stock “dropped significantly,” the board 
reevaluated its position and met in August 2010 to review strategic 
alternatives, including “standalone alternatives, potential acquisition 
targets, and potential financial and strategic partners.”174 The 
RehabCare board determined the only viable strategic acquirer was 
Kindred after considering “four other logical potential strategic 
acquirers of RehabCare and the various reasons that each such third 
party would not be a likely acquirer.”175 Uncertain of Kindred’s 
willingness to proceed with a transaction due to the previous failed 
negotiations, the board directed its financial advisor to contact certain 
financial buyers to assess their interest in a potential transaction.176  
Starting on October 1, 2010, RehabCare’s financial advisor 
contacted nine financial buyers, including parties referred to as 
Party A and Party B in the SEC disclosures.177 Eight of the nine, 
including Party A and Party B, executed confidentiality and DADW 
standstill agreements preventing those parties from making 
unsolicited offers for RehabCare. Following the execution of these 
agreements, Party A and Party B submitted preliminary offers, both 
 
171. See supra Part IV.B.5. 
172. RehabCare Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 12, 2011).  
173. Id.  
174. Id.  
175. Id. These reasons included, “among others, public statements, prior 
business contacts, leverage constraints, recent significant acquisitions, 
and various regulatory and legal matters with respect to such third 
parties.” Id.  
176. Id.  
177. Id. The financial buyers “were selected based on their experience in the 
healthcare industry and their ability to finance a transaction of this 
size.” Id. 
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of which the RehabCare board found to be insufficient.178 The other 
financial buyers did not submit offers and withdrew from the sales 
process. 
On November 4, 2010, Kindred expressed to RehabCare an 
interest in making an all-cash acquisition of RehabCare at a price 
range above that of Party A’s and Party B’s offers.179 A couple of 
weeks later, Kindred and RehabCare entered into a confidentiality 
agreement, including reciprocal standstill provisions. After conducting 
its due diligence review, Kindred submitted its first written offer of 
thirty-two dollars per share. Although more than both Party A’s and 
Party B’s preliminary offers, the RehabCare board nonetheless 
rejected Kindred’s offer as inadequate. 
 Kindred increased its offer price to thirty-five dollars per share, 
of which twenty-six dollars was payable in cash and nine dollars was 
payable in Kindred common stock. The parties executed a merger 
agreement on February 7, 2011. Following the merger announcement, 
a number of RehabCare stockholders brought class action suits 
against the RehabCare directors and Kindred. Those suits were 
consolidated, and, on May 12, 2011, the parties reached a 
memorandum of understanding regarding a settlement.180  
Under the settlement, RehabCare and Kindred completely 
eliminated matching rights from the agreement, reduced their 
termination fee to $13 million, and issued supplemental disclosures. 
More importantly for the purposes of this Article, they waived 
existing standstill provisions.181 The only issue before the court was 
the legal fees for the plaintiff’s counsel.182 With respect to the DADW 
standstills, Vice Chancellor Laster commented: 
I do think it is weird that people persist in the “agree not to 
ask” in the standstill. When is that ever going to hold up if it’s 
actually litigated, particularly after Topps? It’s just one of those 
things that optically looks bad when you’re reviewing the deal 
facts. It doesn’t give you any ultimate benefit because you know 
that the person can get a Topps ruling making you let them 
ask, at a minimum, or can ask in a back channel way. Why 
 
178. Id. Kindred had expressed an interest in engaging in a transaction but 
did not formally submit a bid. Id. 
179. Id.  
180. Id.  
181. Id.  
182. See id. (reporting that the memorandum of understanding reflected the 
parties’ contemplation that “plaintiff’s counsel [would] file petitions for 
the award of attorneys’ fees and expenses”); In re Rehabcare Grp., Inc. 
S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6197-VCL, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 208, at *12–
13 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2011) (granting attorneys’ fees).  
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would you hurt yourself in terms of the optics by asking for 
that? One of those strange things in life.183 
Hence, at least in Vice Chancellor Laster’s opinion, even in the 
context of a more thorough sales process compared to the sales 
process conducted in Topps, DADW standstills may not be upheld 
during the preclosing period.  
2. Celera and the Preclosing Period “Informational Vacuum”  
Several months after Vice Chancellor Laster’s statement in 
RehabCare, Vice Chancellor Donald F. Parsons Jr., again in the 
context of a settlement, addressed a similar DADW standstill in In re 
Celera Corp. Shareholder Litigation.184 The roots of that case began in 
November 2009 when the board of directors of Celera Corporation, a 
healthcare company, started to consider potential strategic 
transactions for the company.185 In early February, the Celera board 
instructed its financial advisor and Celera senior management to 
engage in discussions with potential strategic buyers regarding a sale 
of the whole company, its individual assets, or business units.186  
Celera’s financial advisor and CEO “contacted nine potential 
bidders, five of which performed at least some measure of due 
diligence on the Company by April 2010 . . . .”187 Each of these five 
companies executed a confidentiality agreement containing a 
standstill preventing them from “making offers for Celera shares 
without an express invitation from the Board.”188 The agreements also 
included “a broadly worded provision” that prevented the signing 
parties from requesting a waiver of this restriction.189  
In mid-April, Quest, one of the five parties, made a nonbinding 
preliminary offer to acquire the company as a whole for ten dollars, 
cash, per share.190 Quest “conditioned its offer upon the execution of 
employment agreements with [Celera’s] key personnel including the 
[CEO].”191 In addition to the Quest offer, other parties made “lesser 
offers” and there was an “indication of interest from ‘Bidder C’” to 
 
183. Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 46, In re Rehabcare Grp., Inc. 
S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6197-VCL (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2011).  
184. In re Celera Corp. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 6304-VCP (Del. Ch. Mar. 
23, 2012).  
185. Id. at 5.  
186. Id. at 5–6. 
187. Id. at 6.  
188. Id.  
189. Id. (deeming the agreements “Don’t-Ask-Don’t-Waive Standstills”).  
190. Id. at 7.  
191. Id.  
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acquire only the company’s products division.192 Following 
negotiations with Celera’s special committee formed to oversee the 
sales process, on June 25, Quest increased its offer to $10.25 per 
share, which the special committee deemed acceptable.193 However, 
after meeting with the CEO to negotiate her employment agreement, 
Quest withdrew its offer, citing the potential effects of a negative 
study of one of Celera’s drugs, KIF6, and “‘concerns regarding 
retention of the Company’s management” following the merger.194 
Throughout the remaining six months of 2010, Celera continued to 
pursue strategic transactions but “no serious suitors emerged.”195 
During that time “Celera’s business was deteriorating, due in part to 
the publication of the negative KIF6 study in October.”196  
On January 27, 2011, Quest submitted an offer of $7.75 per share 
to acquire Celera. A few days later, Celera rejected an offer from 
Bidder C to acquire the company’s products division, instead choosing 
to proceed in negotiations with Quest.197 By mid-February, Quest and 
Celera entered into a merger agreement.198 Under the agreement, 
Quest would commence a twenty-one-day tender offer for Celera 
common stock at eight dollars per share.199 The agreement contained a 
no-shop provision, requiring Celera “to terminate any existing 
discussions with, and not to solicit competing offers from, potential 
bidders other than Quest.”200 The agreement also contained a 
termination fee amounting to 3.5% of the transaction value, “but 
arguably as much as 10% of Celera’s enterprise value.”201  
Following the merger announcement, a Celera shareholder 
brought suit, alleging that the Celera board had breached its fiduciary 
duties by executing an agreement with Quest.202 Celera and Quest 
negotiated a settlement with the lead plaintiff, pursuant to which the 
termination fee would be reduced and the no-shop provision would be 
 
192. Id.  
193. Id. 
194. Id. at 7–8 (indicating that Quest learned of the study during 
negotiations with the CEO).  
195. Id. at 8. 
196. Id.  
197. Id. 
198. Id. at 9. 
199. Id. at 12 (indicating that the offer was made through Quest’s acquisition 
subsidiary, Spark Acquisition Corporation).  
200. Id. at 13. 
201. Id.  
202. Id. at 3, 15.  
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amended to invite bidders subject to the DADW provision of the 
standstill to submit bids.203  
Vice Chancellor Parsons issued an opinion upholding the 
settlement agreement.204 In the decision, Vice Chancellor Parsons 
stated he was not proclaiming DADW standstills unenforceable.205 
Moreover, Vice Chancellor Parsons recognized that DADW standstills 
are prevalent in today’s M&A world and stated that any opinion 
declaring such provisions unenforceable could only be made on an 
“appropriately developed record.”206 At the same time, Vice 
Chancellor Parsons stated the “[p]laintiffs have at least a colorable 
argument that these constraints collectively operate to ensure an 
informational vacuum.”207 Once the board is in an “informational 
vacuum,” it would not have any information enabling it to evaluate 
whether compliance with the merger-agreement terms would violate 
the board’s fiduciary duties.208 Thus, he explained, “[c]ontracting into 
such a state conceivably could constitute a breach of fiduciary 
duty.”209 Following Vice Chancellor Parsons’s analysis, it is difficult to 
imagine a DADW standstill that would not have the effect of placing 
the board in a change-of-control transaction in the same 
“informational vacuum.”  
3. Genomics and the Invalidity of DADW Standstills Preventing Even 
Private Indications of Interest  
A little over a year after considering the DADW in Rehabcare, 
Vice Chancellor Laster addressed head-on the validity of DADW 
standstills in In re Complete Genomics, Inc. Shareholder Litigation.210 
He enjoined the enforcement of the DADW standstill without any 
suggestion that the sales process was inadequate or that the standstill 
restrained any party desiring to make a bid.211 In May 2012, Complete 
Genomics, Inc. engaged in a sales process, during which forty-two 
parties were contacted and nine parties signed confidentiality 
 
203. Id. at 15 (indicating that the termination fee was reduced from 
$23.45 million to $15.6 million). 
204. Id. at 3. 
205. Id. at 54.  
206. Id. 
207. Id. at 53.  
208. Id. at 53–54.  
209. Id. at 54.  
210. In re Complete Genomics, Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7888-VCL (Del. 
Ch. Dec. 4, 2012). 
211. Telephonic Oral Argument & the Court’s Ruling, supra note 168, at 20–21. 
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agreements.212 After receiving six proposals, the Complete Genomics 
board narrowed the field to two parties—BGI and Party H.213 The 
board ultimately reached an agreement with BGI in September.214  
Vice Chancellor Laster enjoined the DADW standstill binding 
Party J, who had only participated briefly in the sales process.215 In 
his ruling, Vice Chancellor Laster started by analogizing illegal 
bidder-specific, no-talk clauses216 to DADW standstills, reasoning that 
both can similarly disable a board from making a reasonably informed 
decision.217 While not ruling that DADW standstills were invalid 
per se, Vice Chancellor Laster reasoned that the DADW standstill 
agreement prevented the flow of information from Party J and thus 
precluded the Complete Genomics board from providing a current and 
candid recommendation.218 Citing section 193 of the Restatement of 
Contracts, Vice Chancellor Laster found a reasonable probability that 
the DADW standstill provision “represents a promise by a fiduciary 
to violate its fiduciary duty, or represents a promise that tends to 
induce such a violation.”219  
Vice Chancellor Laster determined that harm existed because 
incoming information from bidders would be prevented under any 
circumstance, regardless of whether Party J breached the standstill.220 
Thus, his concern focused on the harm caused by the board’s act of 
preemptively preventing communication altogether, not the harm that 
could result from another party being unable to bid.221 Vice 
Chancellor Laster supported his reasoning by adding that a topping 
 
212. Telephonic Ruling of the Court at 7–8, In re Complete Genomics, Inc. 
S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7888-VCL, 8 (Del. Ch. Nov. 9, 2012). 
213. Id. at 8, 22. 
214. Id. at 9. 
215. Telephonic Oral Argument & the Court’s Ruling, supra note 168, at 13; 
Complete Genomics, Inc., Solicitation/Recommendation Statement 
(Schedule 14D-9) (Sep. 25, 2012) at 16. Party J first expressed interest 
only a few weeks prior to the deadline for final proposals from Party H 
and BGI. But on August 2, Party J indicated that it would not pursue a 
transaction and ended communications with the Complete Genomics 
board. Id. 
216. Bidder-specific, no-talk provisions were invalidated in Phelps Dodge 
Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., C.A. No. 17398, 1999 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 202 (Del. Ch. Sep. 27, 1999). 
217. Telephonic Oral Argument & the Court’s Ruling, supra note 168, at 14–18. 
218. Id. at 18. 
219. Id. 
220. Id. at 20.  
221. Id. The situation therefore could not be remedied even in the absence of 
a bid from Party J. Id. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 2·2013 
Auction Theory and Standstills 
556 
bid, presumably by Party H, was present, but he also went on to say 
that the reasoning would apply even in the absence of a topping 
bid.222 Reflecting this observation, the order invalidated the provision 
of the standstill that prevented Party J from making private requests 
for permission to submit bids and had no effect on such public 
communications.223 
4. Ancestry.com and the Legitimate Use of DADW Standstills for 
Value-Maximizing Purposes 
Less than three weeks after Vice Chancellor Laster ruled on 
DADW standstills in Complete Genomics, then-Chancellor Strine 
weighed in, although expressing a very different view on the issue. In 
In re Ancestry.com Shareholder Litigation,224 then-Chancellor Strine 
was critical of the manner in which the board used the DADW 
standstill, but he otherwise sanctioned the general use of DADW 
standstills as an auction tool for value-maximization purposes.225 
The Ancestry.com sales process began in January 2012 when 
Party A, a private equity firm, contacted a representative of 
Spectrum Equity Investors to learn more about Ancestory.com, in 
which Spectrum owned a 30.7% stake.226 In February of 2012, the 
Ancestry.com board was informed of the potential interest expressed 
by Party A and decided to explore engaging a financial advisor. On 
March 16, the board authorized discussions with Party A, subject to 
entry into a confidentiality agreement, which was executed by 
Party A later that day. Party A thereafter indicated an interest in 
exploring a transaction for a price between thirty and thirty-
two dollars per share. The board decided to perform a market check 
to evaluate the indication of interest from Party A.227 
On April 22, a representative of private equity firm Permira 
Funds contacted Ancestry.com management to discuss a potential 
transaction. In May, Qatalyst, the board’s selected financial advisor, 
contacted four potential strategic bidders and eight private equity 
firms including Party A and Permira.228 Later that month, Permira 
and six other private equity firms (Parties C, E, F, G, H, and J) 
 
222. Id. at 23.  
223. Complete Genomics, Inc., Amendment No. 12 to Solicitation/
Recommendation Statement (Schedule 14D-9) (Dec. 7, 2012), at 2. 
224. C.A. No. 7988–CS (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012). 
225. Id. slip op. at 23. 
226. Ancestry.com Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Form PREM14A) 
(Oct. 30, 2012), at 16. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
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executed confidentiality agreements.229 Two potential strategic 
acquirers executed confidentiality agreements—Party I on June 4 and 
Party L on July 11—but neither ever submitted a proposal.230  
Between June and October, Ancestry.com received bids from 
several of these financial investors.231 During that time numerous 
newspaper articles reported on the sales process, one of which 
commented on the difficulties involved in the auction as a result of 
tensions between financial bidders.232 Initially, some parties bid as 
high as thirty-eight dollars per share.233 However, after executing 
confidentiality statements and conducting due diligence, the parties 
each reduced their initial bids.234 Ultimately, the Ancestry.com board 
selected four parties—Party C, Party J, Permira, and later Party A—
to invite to submit final bids.235 After Permira submitted the highest 
bid at thirty-two dollars per share and indicated it would go no 
higher, Permira and Ancestry.com executed a merger agreement on 
October 21.236  
Litigation was filed challenging the propriety of the DADW 
standstills used in the process that were not previously mentioned in 
the SEC filings.237 Ancestry.com reacted on December 11 and sent 
letters waiving the DADW provisions to allow parties to request 
standstill waivers.238 On December 17, then-Chancellor Strine issued 
his ruling.239 Careful to take a fact-based approach and not make a 
per se ruling, then-Chancellor Strine noted the limited precedential 
value of bench rulings generally before discussing Complete Genomics 
 
229. Id. at 17. Party B and Party D, potential strategic acquirers, both 
declined to participate in the sales process. Id. 
230. Id. at 17, 19. 
231. Id. at 18–23. 
232. Permira Back in Talks to Acquire Ancestry.com, (Bloomberg TV 
television broadcast Oct. 2, 2012); see also Ancestry.com Inc., 
Preliminary Proxy Statement, supra note 226, at 18 (discussing different 
proposals submitted by financial bidders). 
233. Ancestry.com Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement, supra note 226, at 18. 
234. Id.  
235. Id. at 19, 21 (indicating that Party A was not initially selected as 
one of the final bidders but the board later reinvited Party A to 
engage in the negotiations).  
236. Id. at 25, 26. 
237. Ancestry.com Inc., Current Report: Supplement to Proxy Statement 
(Form 8-K) (Dec. 19, 2012). 
238. Id. 
239. In re Ancestry.com Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7988–CS (Del. Ch. 
Dec. 17, 2012). 
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and Celera.240 He contemplated that DADW standstills could be used 
consistently with a board’s fiduciary duties, but only when used for a 
particular value-maximizing purpose.241 More specifically, he stated 
that the “purpose has to be to allow the seller as a well-motivated 
seller to use it as a gavel, to impress upon the people that it has 
brought into the process the fact that the process is meaningful; that 
if you’re creating an auction, there is really an end to the auction for 
those who participate.”242 
Then-Chancellor Strine went on to find that had the board not 
waived the DADW provisions, it would not have been using the 
DADW standstill for a specific value-maximizing purpose because it 
was not used in the manner he set forth.243 In fact, the Ancestry.com 
board and CEO were not even aware of the clause or its potency, and 
it was not clear whether Qatalyst was informed either.244 In light of 
the waiver, then-Chancellor Strine’s order merely required disclosure 
of the circumstances surrounding the use and waiver of the DADW 
provision.245 
5. The Potentially Erosive Effects of Standstills on Value 
Maximization During the Preclosing Period 
In addition to the potential informational vacuum and 
communication issues caused by standstills preclosing, if used 
improperly, standstills may have other potentially erosive effects on 
value maximization. For example, as then–Vice Chancellor Strine 
recognized in Topps, target boards can use standstills to favor a 
winning bidder over others.246 In addition, winning bidders will 
generally advocate for strict standstills as a type of deal-protection 
device to preclude losing bidders from any participation after 
signing.247 Both of these scenarios became a reality in the 2012 sale of 
Great Wolf Resorts. 
The sale of Great Wolf began in January 2011, when various 
private equity groups and potential strategic buyers approached Great 
 
240. Id. slip op. at 20–22 (“And the Celera case expressly went out of its way 
to say it’s not making a per se rule. I think what Genomics and Celera 
both say, though, is Woah, this is a pretty potent provision.”). 
241. Id. at 23. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. at 25. 
244. Id. at 24–25. 
245. Id. at 26. 
246. In re Topps Co. S’holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 91 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
247. Id. 
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Wolf and expressed interest in a potential transaction.248 The 
company entered into five confidentiality agreements with strategic 
and financial parties, including Apollo.249 Several of the agreements 
were revised to include standstill provisions “for the protection of” 
Great Wolf.250  
In July, Great Wolf’s financial advisor, Deutsche Bank, began a 
formal sale process, contacting approximately thirty-eight potential 
bidders, both strategic and financial.251 Deutsche Bank distributed 
confidentiality agreements to approximately thirty-three parties 
interested in a strategic transaction.252 By December, Great Wolf had 
entered into confidentiality agreements with eleven additional parties 
and continued to amend previously executed confidentiality 
agreements with more restrictive standstill covenants.253 Notably, the 
Apollo–Great Wolf standstill remained far less restrictive than any 
other agreement entered into by Great Wolf.254  
As the sales process progressed, the field was narrowed to 
Party N, Party J, and Apollo.255 After evaluating the proposals, Great 
Wolf agreed to an exclusivity agreement with Apollo on December 20, 
based largely on financing considerations and the fact that Apollo had 
conducted greater due diligence.256 Several successive extensions of 
exclusivity occurred before Great Wolf accepted an offer from Apollo 
priced at five dollars per share.257 On March 12, 2012, the transaction, 
structured as a tender offer, was approved and executed by Apollo 
 
248. Great Wolf Resorts, Inc., Solicitation/Recommendation Statement 
(Schedule 14D-9) (Mar. 13, 2012), at 14. 
249. Id. 
250. Id. at 11, 15. 
251. Id. at 16. 
252. Id. 
253. Id. 
254. Compare Great Wolf Resorts, Inc., Amendment No. 13 to Solicitation/
Recommendation Statement (Schedule 14D-9) (Apr. 25, 2012), at 2 
(containing the confidentiality agreements between Great Wolf and 
prospective bidders), with Great Wolf Resorts, Inc., Solicitation/
Recommendation Statement, supra note 248, at 20 (containing the 
standstill and confidentiality agreement between Apollo and Great Wolf). 
255. Each of these parties had executed confidentiality agreements. Great 
Wolf Resorts, Inc., Solicitation/Recommendation Statement, supra 
note 248, at 15–19. 
256. Id. at 20. 
257. Id. at 21–22, 25. 
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and Great Wolf, and Apollo began the publicly announced tender 
offer the following day.258  
The definitive agreement provided a strong deal-protection 
scheme for Apollo.259 It contained a no-shop provision and provided 
that Great Wolf would not “terminate, waive, amend, modify or fail 
to enforce any existing standstill or confidentiality obligations owed 
by any Person to the Company or any of its Subsidiaries,” subject to 
limited exceptions.260 Under the no-shop provision, Great Wolf was 
only permitted to entertain unsolicited bona fide written takeover 
proposals.261 Great Wolf also agreed to immediately cease negotiations 
with any parties that may be ongoing as of the date of the 
agreement.262 Together, the deal protections and reinforced standstill 
ensured that losing bidders would not even consider a bid.  
After the merger announcement, Great Wolf shares began to 
trade well above the five-dollar offer price from Apollo, shareholders 
began to publicly criticize the deal, and several lawsuits were filed.263 
Thereafter on April 4, despite Apollo’s ironclad deal-protection 
scheme, Great Wolf publicly announced the receipt of an unsolicited 
bid from KSL Capital Partners at a price of $6.25 per share.264 On 
April 5, KSL and Great Wolf entered into a confidentiality agreement 
that waived the standstill provisions with respect to the April 4 KSL 
proposal and any future favorable proposals from KSL.265 A bidding  
258. Id. at 26. The tender offer was scheduled to expire on April 10, 2012. 
Apollo Mgmt. VII LP, Tender Offer Statement (Schedule TO) 
(Mar. 13, 2012), at S-3.  
259. Great Wolf Resorts, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 12, 2012), 
at 9. The deal provisions included an irrevocable top-up option, giving 
Apollo the right, if it were to acquire over fifty percent of Great Wolf 
shares in the tender offer, to purchase enough new Great Wolf shares at 
five dollars per share to obtain ninety percent ownership to accomplish a 
short-form merger, and a poison pill that would be triggered if any 
party other than Apollo accumulated more than 12.5% of Great Wolf 
shares. Id. Additionally, the deal allowed for $7 million in total 
termination fees—as opposed to Apollo’s previously proposed 
$30 million termination fee—and, in the event that a bidder should be 
able to overcome these obstacles, Apollo was granted matching rights. 
Great Wolf Resorts, Inc., Solicitation/Recommendation Statement 
(Schedule 14D-9) (Mar. 13, 2012), at 20–26. 
260. Exhibit 2.1: Agreement and Plan of Merger by and among K-9 Holdings, 
Inc., K-9 Acquisition, Inc. and Great Wolf Resorts, Inc. (Mar. 12, 2012), 
at 54 in Great Wolf Resorts, Inc., Current Report, supra note 259. 
261. Id. 
262. Id. at 55. 
263. Great Wolf Resorts, Inc., Amendment No. 5 to Solicitation/
Recommendation Statement (Schedule 14D-9) (Apr. 9, 2012). 
264. Id. at 19. 
265. Id. 
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war ensued between Apollo and KSL, ending with a $7.85 offer from 
Apollo that was agreed to by Great Wolf on April 20.266 
On April 25, an agreement in principle was reached in the 
litigation.267 In connection with the settlement, Great Wolf agreed to 
make certain disclosures in its SEC filings and waive the standstill 
provisions with certain parties to permit confidential unsolicited bona 
fide written takeover proposals.268 In addition to exposing the details 
of the standstill agreements and the poison pill,269 the disclosures 
required by the settlement revealed that during the process, Deutsche 
Bank may have had a material conflict of interest, and Great Wolf 
may have been aware of it.270 Luckily for the Great Wolf shareholders, 
the favorable treatment of Apollo that granted excessive deal 
protections, facilitated by the use of a standstill, did not ultimately 
prevent the highest offer from being made. 
C. Hollywood Entertainment and the Potential Detrimental Impact of 
Standstills During Preclosing Market Checks  
The events surrounding the sale of Hollywood Entertainment 
Corporation—which operated Hollywood Video stores—best illustrate 
the potential detrimental impact of requiring overbidders to execute 
the same constrictive standstill to which the initial acquirer is subject 
during the postsigning market check. On December 10, 2003, the 
Hollywood board met to discuss strategic options after Mark 
Wattles—founder, chairman, CEO, and second largest shareholder of 
Hollywood Entertainment—learned of various private equity firms 
that could potentially acquire Hollywood, including Leonard Green & 
Partners (LGP).271  
After negotiating with Wattles, LGP signed a nondisclosure 
agreement containing a three-year standstill provision, and thereafter 
LGP proposed to acquire 100% of Hollywood’s stock for 
 
266. Exhibit 99.1: Press Release, Great Wolf Resorts, Great Wolf Resorts 
Says KSL Notifies Company It Does Not Intend to Submit Further 
Acquisition Proposals (Apr. 20, 2012) in Great Wolf Resorts, Inc., 
Current Report, supra note 259. “The $7.85 offer price represents a 
premium of 171% to the six-month average of Great Wolf’s share price 
prior to the announcement of Apollo’s original offer (March 12, 2012), a 
premium of 136% over the ninety-day average of Great Wolf’s share 
price prior to the announcement of the original offer and a premium of 
87% over Great Wolf’s closing stock price on the day prior to the 
announcement of the original offer.” Id. 
267. Great Wolf Resorts, Inc., Amendment No. 13, supra note 254, at 5. 
268. Id. 
269. See supra note 259 for discussion of the poison-pill provision.  
270. Great Wolf Resorts, Inc., Amendment No. 13, supra note 254, at 2. 
271. Hollywood Entm’t Corp., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Form 
PREM14A) (Apr. 23, 2004), at 14. 
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thirteen dollars per share.272 Hollywood’s special committee rejected 
the thirteen-dollar price as inadequate and decided not to solicit 
additional bidders, fearing the risks of material-nonpublic-information 
leaks or a failed transaction.273 LGP then raised its offer to 
fourteen dollars per share, and the parties executed a merger 
agreement on March 28.274 The agreement contained a no-shop 
provision with a fiduciary out.275  
Litigation ensued, provoking a settlement that required additional 
disclosures in the proxy statements, a reduction of the termination 
fee, and the preclusion of Wattles voting on the merger.276 After LGP 
shared its concerns regarding satisfaction of the merger agreement’s 
financing condition, the agreement was amended to reduce the price 
from to $10.25 and eliminate the termination fee and no-shop 
provision.277  
Beginning in October, UBS Securities LLC, Hollywood’s financial 
advisor, contacted twenty-five potential financial buyers and twelve 
potential strategic buyers, including Movie Gallery, Inc. and 
Blockbuster, Inc.278 Movie Gallery and Blockbuster requested 
confidential information.279 However, to access confidential 
information, the amended merger agreement required bidders to enter 
into a confidentiality agreement no less favorable to Hollywood than 
the one entered into by LGP, which contained a three-year 
standstill.280  
On November 2, Blockbuster delivered an all-cash proposal of 
$11.50 per share, but on November 4, the company also indicated that 
it was unwilling to enter into a three-year standstill.281 Movie Gallery 
first unsuccessfully sought to revise the standstill term from three 
years to one year but, on November 19, inexplicably entered into a 
confidentiality agreement identical to the agreement between 
Hollywood and LGP, including a three-year standstill.282 Movie 
 
272. Id. at 15. 
273. Id.  
274. Id. at 19–20. 
275. Id. at 51–54. 
276. Hollywood Entm’t Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Jul. 8, 2004). 
277. Hollywood Entm’t Corp., Amendment No. 3 to Preliminary Proxy 
Statement (Form PRER14A) (Oct. 27, 2004). 
278. Hollywood Entm’t Corp., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Form 
PREM14A) (Jan. 26, 2005), at 15. 
279. Id. at 15, 18. 
280. Id. at 15. 
281. Id. at 16. 
282. Id. at 17. 
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Gallery then increased its offer to $13.25 per share in cash.283 
Blockbuster later issued a press release confirming it was interested 
and able to raise its offer, subject to elimination of the standstill.284  
Hollywood’s special committee met to consider LGP’s indication 
that it would waive the obligation under the merger agreement to 
include a standstill provision.285 The special committee refused to 
eliminate the standstill provision and concluded that including a 
standstill for all bidders would not only yield the highest possible 
price by encouraging bidders to submit their best offers during the 
market-check process—knowing that they would be precluded from 
making a later bid—but also assure bidders that the process would be 
fair to all involved.286 
Blockbuster again issued a press release reiterating its 
unwillingness to enter into a three-year standstill, and on 
December 28, Blockbuster announced it would commence a tender 
offer for Hollywood at $11.50 cash per share.287 On January 10, 2005, 
Hollywood announced it had terminated the LGP agreement and 
entered into an agreement with Movie Gallery.288 On February 2, 
Blockbuster raised its tender offer to a price of $14.50 per share.289 
However, on March 25, Blockbuster announced it would no longer 
pursue the tender offer.290 
Had Blockbuster been brought into the market-check process, its 
presence might have pressured a bidding war between strategic 
rivals.291 A three-year standstill, as Scott Keller, president of 
Dealanalytics.com stated, is “highly unusual,” and “[o]ne year is the 
norm.”292 The imposition of onerous standstills like the one in 
 
283. Id. at 18. 
284. Id. 
285. Id. at 18–19. 
286. Id. at 19. 
287. Id. at 20. 
288. Id. at 22. 
289. Hollywood Entm’t Corp., Solicitation/Recommendation Statement 
(Schedule 14D-9) (Feb. 17, 2005), at 1. 
290. Hollywood Entm’t Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 25, 2005). 
291. After the Blockbuster bid received backing from Carl Icahn, Wattles 
stated: “A strategic buyer can afford to pay more for this company than 
a financial buyer and I am a financial buyer.” Exhibit 99.1: Jonathan 
Berr, Blockbuster Says Hollywood Offer Faces ‘Difficulty’, Bloomberg 
(Dec. 22, 2004, 4:46 PM), in Blockbuster Inc., Current Report 
(Form 8-K) (Dec. 23, 2004). 
292. Id. The three-year standstill requirement imposed on subsequent bidders 
stemmed from the original agreement with LGP, when LGP and 
Wattles were going to buy Hollywood together. Hollywood Entm’t 
Corp., Preliminary Proxy Statement, supra note 278. Wattles was to 
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Hollywood Entertainment is not unique in the M&A world. Although 
they are common, as Part V details, the imposition of such standstills 
is potentially detrimental to shareholders in a sale of corporate control 
and is contrary to auction-theory principles.  
V. Balancing Friends and Foes in a Sale of 
Corporate Control 
In most corporate transactions, the parties on both sides of the 
negotiating table use contracts to manage and balance risks. In the 
context of M&A transactions, standstills are one of the main 
contractual tools used to balance risks inherent in the M&A process. 
Namely, target boards use standstills legitimately to control the 
process and to ensure friendly bidders remain friendly and do not 
become foes that preempt the process. However, in the context of a 
change-of-control transaction, standstills also potentially carry a risk 
that they will inhibit and not enhance shareholder value. This Part 
uses auction-theory principles and examples of deal makers’ real-world 
uses of standstills to detail how standstills can help enhance the sales 
process. But this does not mean that all standstills will universally aid 
the value-maximization process in every deal.  
A. Standstills in General: Using Standstills to Make Friends,  
Prevent Foes, and Maximize Stockholder Value 
With so many moving pieces in a real-world M&A auction, it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to rely on one factor to extract higher bids 
during the presigning sales process. At the same time, standstills play 
an important role in the negotiation and sale of public companies. 
Deal makers certainly believe standstills enhance the bidding process 
for public targets. But the ultimate question is whether this is truly 
the case.  
In the case of a pure auction, Professors Bulow and Klemperer 
argue that because participants are “relatively ill-informed” when 
entering an auction, the auction is “more profitable” than other sale 
processes, namely a sequential process.293 Because bidders enter into 
most standstills as part of a confidentiality agreement and in 
consideration for the receipt of confidential information, many bidders 
 
continue serving as CEO and remain a substantial equity investor in the 
surviving company. Id. at 15. The contemplated employment agreement 
between Wattles and LGP was to terminate on the third anniversary of 
the merger. Exhibit (D)(4): Employment Agreement in Hollywood 
Entm’t Corp., Transaction Statement (Schedule 13E-3) (Apr. 23, 2004).  
293. Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 46, at 1546.  
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would not have access to information if they were not willing to 
execute a standstill.294  
Thus, by being willing to play by the “rules of the game,” a 
bidder is able to engage in due diligence and is on a more level 
playing field with respect to information asymmetries. Therefore, a 
bidder is better able to make an informed decision regarding its 
valuation of the target. Auction theorists have found that by being 
provided with proprietary information, a bidder is put at ease and is 
more likely to submit a higher bid.295 It follows that standstills likely 
enhance the presigning bidding process to the extent standstills are 
inextricably tied to the provision of information. Moreover, standstills 
may provide bidders with an economic incentive to submit their 
highest bid because of the opportunity cost of losing the auction, 
perhaps to a competitor, by not submitting the best bid. 
Auction theorists have also found that the implementation of 
rules and subsequent commitment to those rules play a significant 
role in whether a given sales process maximizes stockholder value.296 
By implementing rules like standstills, targets are able to control the 
sales process. In turn, potential bidders receive some assurance that 
another bidder engaged in the process will not preempt the sales 
process by submitting a bid prematurely.297 Due to these assurances, 
bidders may be more likely to submit a higher bid. Moreover, and 
perhaps more importantly, most confidentiality agreements and 
standstills prevent bidders from revealing that negotiations are taking 
place. That, combined with the fact that standstills prevent bids 
before the target is ready to receive them, allows the target to control 
the flow of information regarding valuation. As previously discussed, 
because most auctions are “sealed-bid” auctions, the bidders are kept 
uninformed of each other’s bids so the target is able to ensure that a 
high bidder will not reduce its bid or refuse to raise its bid after 
learning that the next closest bid is somewhat lower.298  
Auction theorists have found that strategic and financial bidders 
value companies differently and often rely more heavily on different 
types of information in reaching their valuations. Thus, auction 
theorists may argue that whether a bidder is willing to submit a 
higher bid may turn on another significant factor: whether strategic or 
financial bidders are involved in the process. But, as discussed in 
 
294. Boone & Mulherin, supra note 47, at 29 (“In exchange for signing 
[standstill] agreements, prospective bidders are given access to non-
public information about the seller . . . .”). 
295. Id. at 34 (“Revealing proprietary information can reduce uncertainty for 
some buyers, which increases the price they are willing to pay.”). 
296. Povel & Singh, supra note 11, at 1425. 
297. See supra Part II. 
298. See supra notes 105–08, 119 and accompanying text.  
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detail in Part I.A., most real-world M&A sales include both financial 
and strategic bidders. Moreover, even if a particular sales process 
includes only one type of bidder, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
assume that a particular sales process is a purely common-value one 
or a purely private-value one. Thus, the use and validity of 
standstills, particularly DADW standstills, cannot turn simply on 
whether strategic or financial bidders are involved in the sales process, 
and distinctions cannot be drawn based on such an assumption. This 
Article assumes that most, if not all, transactions in which standstills 
are used have both private-value and common-value characteristics.  
B. Using Restrictive Standstills to Extract More Value  
and Make “Friends” 
Although standstills generally aid in value maximization, some 
standstills may cause adverse effects on a sales process involving 
corporate control. In particular, this Part focuses on potentially 
restrictive standstills, such as DADW standstills and longer-term 
standstills. In another recently published article, Promises Made to be 
Broken? Standstill Agreements in Change of Control Transactions, I 
argued the Delaware courts are likely to resolve issues relating to the 
reasonableness of standstill restrictions and the grant of a waiver, or 
the promise not to waive a standstill, based on the reasonableness of 
the target board’s sale process.299 More specifically, I argued the 
courts are likely to examine the presigning sales process in resolving 
these issues.300 I contended that the more thorough the presigning 
sales process, the more likely the Delaware courts would be to uphold 
more restrictive standstills like DADW standstills.301 Thus, if a target 
were to engage in an extensive full-blown auction process presigning, 
the more inclined the Delaware courts would be to enforce a target 
board’s refusal to waive a standstill.302 Conversely, if the target were 
to engage in a more limited sales process presigning or only negotiate 
with one potential bidder, the Delaware courts are more likely to take 
issue with a board’s refusal to waive a standstill or to otherwise 
enforce a standstill that prevents the board from considering all 
possible offers.303 But that article did not address the more 
fundamental issue of whether the use of DADW standstills results in 
shareholder value maximization. I argue that this question should be 
answered by recognizing the need to maintain the standstill’s teeth, 
but these teeth should not be sharpened when other deal-protection 
mechanisms alleviate the workload borne by standstills postsigning.   
299. Sautter, supra note 7, at 988–89. 
300. Id. 
301. Id. at 988.  
302. Id.  
303. Id.  
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1. DADW Standstills 
In Celera, Vice Chancellor Parsons warned both that DADW 
standstills may have the effect of placing the target board in an 
informational vacuum and that, once the board is in such a vacuum, 
it would not be able to obtain information to evaluate whether 
continuing to comply with the merger agreement’s terms would 
violate the board’s fiduciary duties.304 As a result, Vice Chancellor 
Parsons suggested that the board of directors would be breaching its 
fiduciary duties.305 Vice Chancellor Laster then commented in 
RehabCare that DADW standstills “optically look bad” and that they 
are likely inconsistent with then–Vice Chancellor Strine’s ruling in 
Topps.306 Vice Chancellor Laster also seemed to suggest that even in 
the context of a fully shopped deal, a DADW standstill may not be 
valid.307 Then-Chancellor Strine, the author of the Topps opinion, 
then weighed in on DADW standstills in Ancestry.com. In that case, 
then-Chancellor Strine focused on whether the standstill was being 
used as a “gavel” with a specific value-maximizing purpose and 
whether the bidders were made aware that there may not be any 
more bites at the apple.308 Although seemingly irreconcilable at first 
glance, these opinions can be combined with auction theory principles 
and folded into a workable system in which targets can utilize these 
more restrictive standstills to enhance value maximization.  
In an ideal world, to analyze whether DADW standstills are 
legitimate and consistent with auction theory, one would divide the 
sales processes into those with mainly strategic bidders and those with 
mainly financial bidders because of the unique valuations arising from 
each group. However, because in practice most sales processes involve 
both strategic and financial bidders, one must assume that the sale 
process will have both private value and common value elements. But 
the bottom line for all bidders, common value and private value, is 
that information, both with respect to the target company and other 
 
304. In re Celera Corp. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 6304-VCP, 2012 WL 
1020471, at *21 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012). 
305. Id.  
306. In re Rehabcare Grp., Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6197-VCL, 2011 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 208, at *46 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2011).  
307. See Telephonic Ruling of the Court, supra note 212, at 5, 7–8 (declining 
to enjoin the standstill provision but recognizing that legal issues were 
present even where forty-two parties were contacted as potential 
acquirers); see also Telephonic Oral Argument & the Court’s Ruling, 
supra note 168, at 18 (finding that a DADW standstill “represents a 
promise by a fiduciary to violate its fiduciary duty, or represents a 
promise that tends to induce such a violation”). 
308. In re Ancestry.com Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7988–CS, slip op. 23 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012). 
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bidders, is of paramount importance. As previously discussed, 
standstills help to control this flow of information. Moreover, as 
auction theorists have found, to the extent that is practical, the 
enactment of rules and structure in the auction process aids in 
enhancing value and optimizing the auction. Standstills are one of the 
tools in a target board’s toolkit. But some limitations must be placed 
on the use of the standstills to obtain the most value-enhancing 
incentives and to ensure the board’s sale process is consistent with its 
fiduciary duties.  
First, consistent with then–Vice Chancellor Strine’s indication in 
Topps and my argument in Promises Made to be Broken? Standstill 
Agreements in Change of Control Transactions, the target board 
must engage in significant presigning shopping of the target. Such 
presigning shopping may help the board to eliminate the potential for 
placing itself in the informational vacuum of which Vice Chancellor 
Parsons warns. Second, consistent with then-Chancellor Strine’s 
comments in Ancestry.com, all bidders entering into the bidding 
process and agreeing to a standstill with the target must be fully 
informed of the rules in advance, including the fact that the 
standstills will not be waived once the sales process has come to an 
end. Third, to maintain the integrity of the sales process, the target 
must continue to abide by the rules it sets forth and not make 
concessions to one bidder over another or otherwise favor any bidder. 
Fourth, unlike the DADW standstills we have seen to date, I contend 
the standstill should be paired with a minimal fiduciary out. That is, 
a bidder bound by such a standstill should be able to privately 
request a waiver if it can set forth compelling and clearly delineated 
reasons that it would like to make or increase its bid. These reasons 
should be based on external and intervening factors such as the 
release of new information, which would cause the bidder to increase 
its valuation of the target. This minimal fiduciary out is analogous to 
the merger-recommendation fiduciary out for intervening events that 
has become popular in recent years.309  
In my previous work, I made clear that although the Delaware 
courts may likely take a different path based on their dicta to date, I 
was of the opinion that boards of directors should not be able to 
completely limit their ability to review superior offers in the sale-of-
control context.310 Allowing losing bidders to request a waiver and 
make an overbid pursuant to a minimal fiduciary out strikes a 
balance between the concern that boards should not foreclose 
themselves from considering higher bids and the legitimate goal 
 
309. See Sautter, supra note 138, at 59, 85–87, for a description of these 
merger-recommendation fiduciary outs for intervening events. 
310. Sautter, supra note 7, at 989 n.433. 
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supported by auction-theory principles of using standstills to extract 
more value presigning.  
If such a fiduciary out were to be implemented, it should be 
paired with a slightly higher termination fee applicable in these 
limited circumstances to these bidders. For example, if the merger 
agreement contains a 3% termination fee, a 4 or 4.5% termination fee 
may be appropriate. The goal behind the minimal fiduciary out is to 
limit or eliminate the informational vacuum these standstills 
potentially cause. By pairing the minimal fiduciary out with a slightly 
increased termination fee, the goal is to maintain the “teeth” of the 
standstill.  
Moreover, a similar staggered termination fee has been used in 
some recent deals in the context of a change of merger 
recommendation based on an intervening event rather than a superior 
proposal.311 In those deals, if the board were to terminate the 
agreement for an intervening event, a higher termination fee becomes 
payable.312 Thus, deal makers have experience in negotiating and 
interpreting these intervening events as well as the staggered 
termination fees that may be applicable.  
The foregoing framework rests on the assumption that the sales 
process used is that of a classic auction as described in Part III.B.1. 
The likelihood of a classic auction being used as the chosen sales 
process is significant because Professors Boone and Mulherin’s study 
of 400 corporate takeovers found that half resulted from an auction 
process.313 The framework would also work in the context of an 
extensive market canvass as described in Part III.B.2. Although deal 
makers should opt for less restrictive standstill terms in such 
situations because there is a greater risk that they have not shopped 
the market and that the value being received is not as high as that 
which could be received pursuant to an auction.  
2. Longer-Term Standstills 
Standstills with unusually long durations, like that in the 
Hollywood Entertainment deal, can be overly restrictive. Hollywood’s 
three-year term standstill lasted for a period three times longer than 
 
311. Something Old, Something New . . . : A Quick Survey of Recent 
Developments in Public M&A Deal Terms, Kirkland M&A Update 
(Kirkland & Ellis LLP), May 2, 2011, at 1 [hereinafter Something Old, 
Something New] (mentioning deals that used a higher termination fee 
“payable to the buyer if it terminates the deal following an intervening 
event change of recommendation by the target”); see also Sautter, supra 
note 138, at 102–03 (suggesting a higher termination fee be applicable to 
intervening event change of recommendations).  
312. Something Old, Something New, supra note 311.  
313. See supra Part III.B.1 for a discussion of this study and the auction 
process.  
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that of an average standstill. Because of this burdensome provision, at 
least one major player, Blockbuster, was not even willing to enter into 
the standstill agreement and participate in a friendly process. 
Considering that the brick-and-mortar movie-rental industry—which 
as we now know and leaders of all companies involved in the process 
feared—was rapidly declining, a three-year standstill would have 
imposed severe limitations on Blockbuster’s ability to pursue a 
strategic transaction with Hollywood Entertainment. The same would 
hold true for many businesses in today’s rapidly changing global 
marketplace, where over a period of three years, entire industries and 
business can rise or fall. Implementing such a long standstill could 
actually have the reverse effect of value maximization: using a 
standstill with such a long duration can deter viable and wealthy 
bidders from participating in a friendly process that could result in a 
higher bid after confirmatory due diligence. Moreover, such a long-
term standstill could cause hostile action, further risking disruption of 
a certain, but less favorable, deal already in place.  
Further, the Hollywood deal shows the potential harm to future 
bidders who are not part of the original sales process or even privy to 
a standstill, but who enter the picture after a definitive agreement is 
announced. A typical provision in a merger agreement requires that 
for any new bidder to gain access to confidential information, it must 
enter into a confidentiality agreement no less favorable to the bidder 
than the one entered into between the parties to the merger 
agreement. Thus, the winning bidder will be able to use this provision 
as leverage or to impose an abnormally long standstill on future 
bidders to inhibit their ability to make higher proposals and protect 
the deal at the expense of shareholders. 
While every sales process is different and often the target may 
need substantial protections, in most instances the decision to use an 
abnormally long standstill will not be value accretive to the sales 
process. These standstills are not responsive to changing market 
conditions or to new circumstances that arise over a relatively lengthy 
sales process. Instead, the term of the standstill should bear a direct 
relationship to the industry in which the target operates, taking into 
consideration possible market changes as well as the type of sales 
process being used. For example, deal makers should consider the 
time needed to conduct the sales process—whether it is an auction, 
market canvass, or a limited negotiation—and the time it will take to 
get to closing. To be reasonable, standstills should be tailored to 
account for these factors and should not far exceed the estimated time 
to closing.  
Opting for a timeframe beyond that estimate makes it appear 
that the board is using the standstill for potentially nefarious means. 
While standstills should be strong enough to discourage bids outside 
of the sales process, they should not be used to completely prevent a 
bidder from making any offer at any time. If greater protections or 
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incentives are needed, myriad other readily available deal-protection 
devices can be used to encourage bidders to put their best bids on the 
table. 
3. An Alternative to DADW Standstills 
In lieu of using DADW standstills or the revised DADW system 
described previously, the target and the winning bidder have other 
alternatives in the form of deal-protection devices. A definitive 
acquisition agreement for a publicly traded target generally contains a 
number of deal-protection devices aimed at preventing third-party 
overbids during the preclosing period. In negotiating these deal-
protection devices, the target and initial acquirer can tailor those 
devices to specifically hinder bids being submitted by bidders who 
have previously executed a standstill. More specifically, the parties 
could adopt a staggered termination fee such that if the target were 
to enter into a transaction with an overbidder who had previously 
executed a standstill, that transaction would result in a higher 
termination fee than would typically be paid under the agreement.  
The possibility of a higher termination fee may incentivize bidders 
to submit their best offers during the presigning sales process. For 
example, the typical termination fee in an M&A transaction is three 
to four percent of the deal value.314 The merger agreement between a 
target and a winning bidder could contain a three percent termination 
fee applicable to most termination events, including the target’s 
termination of the agreement to enter into an agreement with a third-
party overbidder who was not bound by a standstill. If, however, the 
third-party overbidder is a party bound by a standstill, a higher 
termination fee, like five, six, or even seven percent, could be 
applicable.  
Deal makers could also increase the termination fee based on how 
well shopped the company was presigning. For example, if the target 
held a full public auction presigning, the termination fee applicable to 
third-party overbidders bound by a standstill could be higher. This 
may further incentivize bidders to submit their highest bids 
presigning as a higher termination fee would be applicable to them 
postsigning. Moreover, the winning bidder would be further assured 
that its deal would be protected by virtue of the termination fee. Of 
course for this arrangement to properly incentivize bidders, all bidders 
must be made aware, prior to bidding, that the target is willing to 
agree to this higher-termination-fee structure in the definitive 
acquisition agreement with the winning bidder. 
 
314. Something Old, Something New, supra note 311, at 2 (noting that most 
merger agreements provide for a break-up fee between two percent and 
four percent of deal’s value). 
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C. Standstills that Become Unusually Restrictive When Combined with 
Other Contractual Rights: A Backdoor Method of Limiting Stockholder Value 
In addition to standstills that may be considered overly restrictive 
such as DADW standstills and longer term standstills, a seemingly 
less restrictive standstill could be combined with other contractual 
rights to result in a scheme detrimental to value maximization. When 
standstills continue to impose obligations on all parties after one 
party enters into a definitive merger agreement, the world of 
contractual rights among bidders and the target substantially change, 
but the standstill usually does not. This is a foreseeable event and 
perhaps one of the main reasons that standstills contribute to value 
maximization. Because the standstill will continue to operate to 
restrict the manner in which a losing bidder may make an offer, if an 
offer is allowed at all, bidders are incentivized to make their best 
offers during the period when offers are freely invited. Further, 
bidders know that even if a standstill can somehow be overcome, 
there is a cost to jumping a winning deal; thus, most would rather be 
the first to sign. However foreseeable a change in position regarding 
the standstill is though, bidders will not know the extent of this 
change in rights until the merger agreement is announced. 
From signing until closing, the same level of inefficiency that 
Professors Bulow and Klemperer argue makes the auction more 
profitable,315 does not necessarily exist. Of course, new bidders who 
have previously neither engaged in due diligence nor been privy to the 
target’s confidential information will still be “relatively ill-informed.” 
But at the same time, a potential overbidder benefits from knowing 
the price being paid by the winning bidder, from seeing the deal 
embodied in the merger agreement, and from having access to any 
other publicly available information regarding the preexisting deal. In 
other words, a potential overbidder can free ride to a certain extent 
on the existing deal to make an acquisition proposal. Those bidders 
who were part of the presigning sales process and gained access to the 
target’s publicly available information are obviously at a greater 
advantage in this respect.  
Of course, if all the bidders knew that the standstill would 
disappear after the signing of an agreement, then all bidders would 
not necessarily be incentivized to submit their highest bid before 
signing—at least by virtue of the standstill. There are advantages to 
being the first to sign however, such as deal-protection devices that 
would discourage bidders from submitting uncompetitive bids. But for 
standstills to be effective presigning, they must continue after a deal 
is signed; otherwise, they may be ignored. Granted that a standstill 
needs to continue after a deal is signed to have any integrity, it 
 
315. Bulow & Klemperer, supra note 46, at 1546.  
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should not become even more restrictive and made part of an 
impenetrable deal-protection scheme. 
An excellent example of this potentially impenetrable deal-
protection scheme is the Great Wolf deal.316 In that deal, the 
standstills executed by the potential bidders seemed to become 
DADW standstills, but only after the definitive acquisition agreement 
was executed. The bidders in that transaction entered the process and 
executed standstills on the belief that they were on a level playing 
field. However, without asking for final bids from the bidders, Great 
Wolf granted Apollo exclusivity, which ultimately led to an executed 
agreement between the two parties. After the execution of the Great 
Wolf–Apollo agreement, the previously executed standstills prevented 
the bidders from making an offer for Great Wolf.317 Not only did the 
standstills continue to restrict bidders interested in Great Wolf, in 
combination with the other deal protections embodied in the Great 
Wolf–Apollo agreement, a standstill waiver could not be affected.318 
Thus, the standstill became, what I would dub, a “Reverse DADW” 
standstill. Luckily for the Great Wolf shareholders, however, KSL, 
who was uninhibited by a standstill, created the opportunity for a 
more fair and open sales process and thereby increased shareholder 
wealth by 171%.319 But the other bidders were unable to participate 
when KSL entered the picture because of the transformation of the 
standstill into a Reverse DADW standstill.  
A Delaware court is not likely to find such a Reverse DADW 
Standstill to be valid using either Vice Chancellor Parsons’s or now–
Chief Justice Strine’s reasoning. Applying then-Chancellor Strine’s 
reasoning from Ancestry.com, the provision was not used as a “gavel” 
with the goal of value maximization.320 Based on the facts as 
extracted from SEC filings, during its sales process, Great Wolf does 
not appear to have asked bidders to make final bids or to have told 
bidders in advance of the auction ending.321 Because of this, the 
bidders may have been operating under the assumption they could 
request a waiver if need be. Instead of using the standstill as a means 
of extracting greater value by instructing bidders to submit their best 
and final offers for possible deal protection in the resulting agreement, 
Great Wolf appears to have used the standstills as a form of deal-
protection device which favored Apollo. Under Ancestry.com, this is 
 
316. See supra Part IV.B.5. 
317. See supra note 268 and accompanying text. 
318. See supra notes 259–62 and accompanying text. 
319. See supra notes 266 and accompanying text. 
320. In re Ancestry.com Inc. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 7988–CS, slip op. 23 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012). 
321. See supra notes 248–57 and accompanying text. 
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potentially even more problematic than using a DADW standstill 
whereby bidders would be made aware of the consequences. 
Not only would these Reverse DADW standstills not carry weight 
under now–Chief Justice Strine’s reasoning but also a court applying 
Vice Chancellor Parsons’s reasoning would likely find that a target’s 
use of such a combination would result in an informational vacuum.322 
The bidders previously bound by the standstills would not be able to 
make a bid and the target board, like the Great Wolf board, would be 
unable to waive the standstill provision to consider potentially higher 
bids. The end result then places the board in an informational 
vacuum when making its recommendation regarding the contemplated 
transaction. Thus, the Reverse DADW standstill combination, like 
the Great Wolf DADW standstill, would likely be invalid in Vice 
Chancellor Parsons’s view.  
In cases like Great Wolf, what begins as a necessary prelude for 
the protection of the target and the facilitation of an exchange of 
confidential information can turn into both a value-maximization 
deterrent for the target and a powerful deal-protection device for the 
first party that obtains a signed agreement. Standstills customarily 
are used to deter hostile bids or control the auction process and 
prevent a bidder from buying the target at a bargain price. When 
standstills are combined with other contractual provisions to preempt 
the auction process and prevent interested buyers from any further 
participation in the sales process, standstills can become an 
impediment to value maximization. Reminiscent of the methods used 
by the mafia to “eliminate the competition,” basic supply and demand 
dictates that the result will allow a bidder to buy the target at a 
bargain price.  
Conclusion 
Standstills, the M&A equivalents of a “school-yard time-out,”323 
have become standard features of the public company sales process. 
Despite the prevalence of standstills, courts and academics alike, have 
not fully addressed the role of standstills in the sales process or 
whether they aid in maximizing stockholder value. Auction theorists 
agree that a significant factor in any M&A sale process is the presence 
of asymmetric information. In most auctions, standstills allow the 
target to control the process by keeping bidders uninformed of each 
other’s bids and ensuring that no bidder will preempt the process 
while giving bidders access to its proprietary information, assuring 
bidders of their valuation. Thus, standstills help to enhance the sales 
 
322. In re Celera Corp. S’holder Litig., C.A. No. 6304-VCP, 2012 WL 
1020471, at *21 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012). 
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process by selectively controlling information releases to encourage 
higher bids. As such, standstills at least aid in providing a floor for 
the valuation of the target. In doing so, standstills help to keep 
bidders friendly.  
At the same time, however, when standstills are enhanced to 
provide greater restrictions on the sales process or to perform 
functions after the execution of a definitive agreement with a winning 
bidder, there is a risk these restrictions could have detrimental effects 
on value maximization. This Article uses auction theory to provide a 
framework under which more restrictive standstill provisions, like 
DADW standstills, may be used legitimately under certain 
circumstances to extract value from bidders. This framework takes 
into account several factors including that DADW standstills only be 
used pursuant to a thorough shopping process in which all bidders are 
informed that they may never have another bite at the apple. 
Moreover, this framework provides that such standstills be paired 
with a minimal fiduciary out based on intervening events that carries 
a slightly increased termination fee. Other forms of restrictive 
standstills, such as standstills with long durations or reverse DADW 
standstills, should be declared invalid. As an alternative to DADW 
standstills, or even the revised DADW framework advocated in this 
Article, I suggest using a staggered termination fee that can better 
achieve value maximization with less risk. In adopting the framework 
set forth in this Article, deal makers would strike a balance between 
keeping bidders from becoming foes to the winning bidder while at the 
same time encouraging the maximization of stockholder value.  
 
  
